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Principles over Principals? How Innovation Affects the
Agency Relationship in Medical and Legal Practice
Julian J.Z. Polaris
ABSTRACT:
This Note outlines a conceptual framework for defining and analyzing
innovation in the professional practice of medicine and law. The two professions
have structural and historical similarities, and both are organized around the
principal-agent relationship. Some types of professional activity adhere to the
traditional agency model of principal-centered practice, but innovative
professionals who develop novel tools and techniques often deviate from the
agency model in interesting ways. This Note explores how that distinction plays
out by identifying examples from academic medicine, public interest "cause
lawyering", and corporate law. The field of medicine is governed by a regulatory
regime that strictly differentiates routine practice from the experimental activities
of clinical research, but the legal profession is governed by a monolithic code of
conduct that does not explicitly acknowledge the types of innovation described
here. Certain key events in the twentieth century help to explain why the
government has chosen to tightly regulate innovation in medicine but not in law,
and it turns out that innovators in both fields have found ways to stretch or bend
the rules. These observations shed light on each profession's unique culture and
can inform current debates over regulatory reform.
. J.D. expected 2015 from the Yale Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Bill
Sage for his guidance in shaping and developing the topic; Professors Jeffrey Katz, Lawrence Fox,
and Susan Martyn for their helpful feedback on later drafts; and the wonderful editors at the Yale
Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics for their thoughtful suggestions and careful edits.
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INTRODUCTION: WORKBENCH AND LAB BENCH
Lawyering on behalf of a client is an inherently goal-oriented occupation.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct each attorney to "take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor" and to "act .. . with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."' In the
classical conception of litigation, the opposing lawyers deliver rousing orations
and hurl pointed objections to persuade the decision makers to accept their
version of the facts and interpretation of the law. This clash is the crux of our
adversarial legal system, which is predicated on "the assumption that the truth of
a controversy will best be arrived at by granting the competing parties, with the
help of an advocate, an opportunity to fight as hard as possible."2
In this view, the courtroom is like a workbench. Just as a carpenter takes a
block of wood and carefully cuts, shapes, and sands it down into a chair, the
attorneys take turns hewing away unhelpful facts and spurious reasoning to
reveal the ultimate truth at the heart of the case. Through their antagonistic
advocacy, they fulfill their roles as officers of the court in a coordinated and
linear journey toward securing a just resolution.3
As an alternative perspective, we might swap the workbench for a laboratory
bench. Like scientific researchers who devise methodical experiments to
determine descriptive characteristics and isolate causal relationships,4 each
attorney presents a hypothesis about the outcome of the case, and carefully
combines this piece of evidence with that legal argument to see if a favorable
theory will carry the day.5 Unlike the workbench analogy, where skilled
craftsmen practice routine gestures to achieve an expected end, the process of
experimentation is non-linear. The results of an experiment may not turn out as
expected or hoped, but each case serves to advance or reaffirm the body of legal
precedent that defines what the law "is" for future litigants.6 In this way,
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. para. 1 (2013) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
2. Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of Seeking
Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 147, 147 (2002).
3. See id. at 161.
4. "[T]he structure of scientific experiments is fundamentally stable all across the basic-
clinical spectrum." Steven Joffe & Franklin G. Miller, Bench to Bedside: Mapping the Moral
Terrain of Clinical Research, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 34 (2008) (describing the scientific
method of prospectively defined hypothesis, research methods, and outcome assessment metrics).
5. The lawyers challenging anti-contraception statutes in the 1960s, for example, proposed that
the laws were unconstitutional because they "den[ied] appellants the right to liberty and property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Brief for Appellants at 11,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. See, e.g., I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 17 (1991) (explaining that
the "common law tradition" is rooted in "the patterns of concrete decisions built up by courts ...
over decades, generations, centuries").
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litigation creates "generalizable knowledge," the defining feature of medical
research.
The lab bench analogy is not appropriate for all types of legal work,
however. Preparing standard documents and settling run-of-the-mill disputes
seem more like the familiar everyday tasks of a craftsman. Legal activity starts to
look more like experimentation when it is motivated at least in part by the desire
to establish generalizable knowledge or impact beyond the desire for a favorable
outcome in the particular case for the particular client. Typically, the opportunity
for novel developments in law arises out of some novel element in the fact
pattern or legal argument.
This division is familiar in the world of medicine, where medical practice on
human patients and medical research on human subjects are strictly differentiated
with separate ethical8 and legal codes.9 The Belmont Report, the foundational
code of ethics for research on human subjects,'o emphasizes the pursuit of
"generalizable knowledge" to differentiate research from "medical or behavioral
practice," which is based on diagnosis and treatment." As the Report explains,
"The fact that a procedure is . . . new, untested or different[] does not
automatically place it in the category of research."' 2 Rather, the defining feature
is one of intent: research is "designed to test an hypothesis [and] permit
7. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2014) (defining "research" as "a systematic investigation ...
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge") (emphasis added).
8. See Nat'l Comm. for the Prot. of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES (HHS) (April 18, 1979) [hereinafter Belmont
Report], http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html. The Belmont Report
states that research in human subjects must be guided by the core ethical principles of respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice.
9. See Joel Kupersmith, Reforming the Research Regulatory System, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr.
24, 2013, 2:26 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/04/24/reforming-the-research-regulatory-
system/ (noting that categorizing an activity as research triggers "an intensive set of requirements[,]
... including review, approval, and continued oversight by an Institutional Review Board (IRB);
reporting requirements; the necessity for informed consent (often highly complex); and other
administrative components"). These requirements apply to all research in human subjects that
receives federal funding, as outlined in the HHS "Common Rule." 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2014).
10. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ("Common Rule'), HHS,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited June 6, 2013) ("The
current U.S. system of protection for human research subjects is heavily influenced by the Belmont
Report, written in 1979.").
11. See Belmont Report, supra note 8.
12. Id. The Belmont Report describes novel treatments as "experimental" whether or not they
constitute research. I removed the term to avoid confusion with my chosen terminology in this
Note, as explained below. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. Briefly, I use
"experimentation" as a trans-substantive concept equivalent to medical research, with a focus on
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conclusions to be drawn."' 3 These conclusions go beyond the specific results of
the study and express "theories, principles, and statements of relationships" in
order "to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge."1 4
This distinction between medical treatment and medical research serves as a
point of departure for this Note, which explores innovation in the professional
practice of medicine and law. Innovation has long been an essential feature of
both occupations, but only recently have scholars begun to describe the process
of innovation itself'5 and to determine how best to promote creativity as part of
professional education and training.' 6 Doctors and lawyers are often cited side by
side in discussions of the "learned professions"' 7 and obligations in principal-
agent relationships.' 8 These historical and structural similarities help to highlight
the common processes at the heart of medical and legal innovation, and cast in
sharp relief the stark differences in the way the federal government has
approached the regulation of innovative practitioners in each field.' 9
This discussion matters because of the important role that doctors and
lawyers play in supporting individual prosperity and promoting social wellbeing.
13. Belmont Report, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. See Riskin et al., Innovation in Surgery: A Historical Perspective, 244 ANNALS SURGERY
686, 686 (2006) ("While innovation in surgery has a rich tradition, the field and study of surgical
innovation are new."); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZo L. REV. 1553, 1554-55 (2007) ("Shelves are laden
with scholarly writings on particular innovations .... But studies of the process of innovation,
though not unknown, are comparatively few.").
16. See Roberta B. Ness, Commentary: Teaching Creativity and Innovative Thinking in
Medicine and the Health Sciences, 86 ACAD. MED. 1201, 1201 (2011) ("Although academic
medicine provides informal training in creativity and innovation, it has yet to incorporate formal
instruction on these topics into medical education."); Karl S. Okamoto, Learning and Learning-to-
Learn by Doing: Simulating Corporate Practice in Law School, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 498, 500 (1995)
(noting that "innovation is a word we rarely hear in law school," and that "[i]nnovation requires a
different kind of self-learning" than what is currently taught).
17. See, e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Character, Virtue and Self-Interest in the Ethics of the
Professions, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 53, 58 (1989).
18. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary: Discarding a
Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 586, 593 (2005) ("[I]n some cases the whole point of the
activity is to promote someone's right, e.g. as when an attorney defends his client's innocence, or
when a physician diagnoses and treats a patient.").
19. Clinical research is largely regulated at the federal level. See infra notes 185-188 and
accompanying text. The legal profession is largely self-regulated. See infra notes 191-192, and
accompanying text. Legal practice is governed at the state level, but state codes of professional
conduct are based in large part on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are developed
by the American Bar Association (ABA). See Ctr. for Prof'I Responsibility, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/
publications/model rulesof professionalconduct.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) ("California is
the only state that does not have professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.").
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The actual work of open heart surgery may bear little resemblance to cross-
examining a witness, but as this Note argues, doctors and lawyers share common
heuristics for improving the efficiency and efficacy of their work. Exploring the
features they have in common also allows us to identify particular characteristics
that make each profession unique, highlighting traits that should guide future
discussions about regulatory reform.
To organize my comparison of the two occupations, I outline in Part I a
generalized conceptual framework for professional activity. Routine practice and
experimentation are not a stark binary; rather, they sit at opposite ends of a
spectrum. Professional practice is defined by the principal-agent relationship, in
which the agent aims to serve the principal's interest. Novel elements and
developments move us along the spectrum toward experimentation, but the
operative distinction between practice and experimentation is a reorientation of
the agent's focus from the interests of the principal to the interests of the broader
class of individuals to which the principal belongs.
Part II fills in the conceptual framework by examining where innovative
activity actually occurs, explaining that innovation and experimentation are
primarily concentrated in a few professional contexts. Academic medical centers
produce most of the major advances in medical practice and research. Novel
legal techniques and strategies, meanwhile, are typically generated by attorneys
in two highly disparate lines of work: "cause lawyers" who use litigation as a tool
for social change,20 and attorneys in prestigious private firms who innovate on
behalf of large corporate clients.
Part III notes that both professions struggle with the challenge of accurately
representing reality when designing research studies or planning litigation
strategy, as well as the difficulty of encouraging the adoption of novel
developments beyond the small communities of innovators identified in Part II.
Despite these similarities in the processes and players of innovation, the two
professions are subject to very different regulatory regimes. The federal
government has imposed a dualistic regulatory model on medicine, with a bright
line differentiating medical research from medical treatment. The legal
profession, meanwhile, maintains a single code of professional conduct that does
not explicitly acknowledge innovation. Part IV explains that difference by
exploring the historical development and rationales of these regulations.
20. "Cause lawyer" is the term used by Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat, who have been
leaders in producing and assembling scholarship on this branch of the legal profession. See STUART
A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND
CAUSE LAWYERING 5 (2004) [hereinafter SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN] (explaining why they prefer
"cause lawyer" over other terms). Labels like public interest lawyer, movement lawyer, and social
justice lawyer have also been used to signify the same class of attorneys or to differentiate within or
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Part V concludes with the observation that even with widely divergent
regulatory approaches, both professions show evidence of gravitating toward the
middle of the spectrum: practitioners seek to capture the benefits of novel
developments, while professionals engaged in experimentation often retain
elements of the principal-centered ethical framework characteristic of routine
practice. This observation not only underscores the essential commonalities of
innovative work in the two professions, but also brings a new perspective to
current debates about the future directions of regulatory reform.
Finally, a brief note on terminology. "Experimentation" is no longer the
preferred term for medical research involving human subjects, which is now
called "clinical research." 2' For the purposes of this Note, however,
"experimentation" will serve as a trans-substantive term for professional
activities that seek generalizable knowledge or impact through planned and
controlled interactions with individuals, as outlined in Section I.C. 2 2 Similarly,
the "principal-agent relationship" will provide a generalized vocabulary for
discussing patients, subjects,2 3 and clients (principals) and their relationships
with doctors, clinical researchers, 2 4 and lawyers (agents). The term "innovation"
is used throughout to refer to a novel development, such as a new surgical
technique or a creative corporate structure.
21. See Nat'l Inst. of Child Health and Human Dev., Clinical Trials & Clinical Research,
NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (last updated Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/
health/clinicalresearch/Pages/index.aspx ("Clinical research is research that directly involves a
particular person or group of people."). These terms matter, as has been documented in studies
polling patients about their willingness to participate in potential activities with various names.
Surveyed patients have consistently reported that "medical experiments" sound riskier than terms
like "medical research" or "clinical studies." See Ronald R. Butters et al., Semantic and Pragmatic
Variability in Medical Research Terms: Implications for Obtaining Meaningful Informed Consent,
75 AM. SPEECH 149, 162 (2000); Jeremy Sugarman et al., What Patients Say About Medical
Research, ETHICS & HUM. RES., Jul.-Aug. 1998, at 1, 3.
22. In medicine, this means clinical research. For the equivalent activity in law, I use the terms
"impact litigation" and "test case" interchangeably.
23. In medicine, a "patient" is an individual seeking medical treatment from a physician, while
an individual enrolled in a research study is called a "research subject." However, there are some in
the bioethics community who now prefer the term "participants." See Ethical and Policy Issues in
International Research: Clinical Trials in Developing Countries, NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMM'N, at xv n.l (Apr. 2001), http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/clinicalNoll.pdf (choosing
the term "participant" because "subject," though "widely used . . ., impl[ies] a diminished position
of those enrolled in research in relation to the researcher").
24. Individuals with training in both medical practice and academic research are sometimes
referred to as "physician-researchers," highlighting "the dual role of physician-researcher in
relation to the patient-subject." Robert J. Levine, Clinical Trials and Physicians as Double Agents,
65 YALE J. Bio. MED. 65, 66 (1992).
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I. THE SPECTRUM OF PRACTICE AND EXPERIMENTATION
Practice and experimentation lie at opposite ends of the spectrum of
professional activity. Part I divides the spectrum into three categories-routine
practice, innovative practice, and experimentation-and explains the professional
outlook and types of behavior associated with each one, drawing examples from
medicine and finding comparable examples in law.
These labels are not meant to represent hard and fast classifications, since
the lines that divide them are neither easy to define nor important for their precise
location. Rather, the three categories serve as general signposts along a
continuous spectrum. Moving along the spectrum from routine practice toward
experimentation relies on a weakening emphasis on principal-centered practice
and a stronger focus on generalizability with regard to a class of principals. Note
that the categories I will discuss are not professional roles, but rather designate
types of professional activity. A single individual may shift back and forth along
the spectrum over the course of a career or even over the course of a day.25
A. Routine Practice
Medical and legal practice, as defined in this Note, are what most people
think of when they imagine the day-to-day work of doctors and lawyers. These
professionals exemplify the principal-agent relationship,2 6 and each profession's
code of ethics reflects a duty to further the principal's interests. 27 The American
Medical Association (AMA) explains that, within the treatment relationship, the
"physician is ethically required to use sound medical judgment, holding the best
interests of the patient as paramount."28 Similarly, the American Bar Association
(ABA) instructs lawyers to "provide competent representation to a client," 29
employing "whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a
client's cause or endeavor." 30
25. Physicians in academic medical centers, for example, often divide their time between
seeing patients and conducting research. Similarly, some corporate attorneys take time away from
client-centered practice to work pro bono with public interest organizations on impact litigation.
26. See Brenda Almond, Reasonable Partiality in Professional Relationships, 8 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 155, 165 (2005) (noting that doctors and lawyers "have special
obligations to their clients" and generally "promote their clients' interests above those of others.");
Morreim, supra note 18, at 593.
27. The American Medical Association (AMA) exhorts physicians "to place patients' welfare
above their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their
patients' welfare," CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 10.015 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2001), echoing the ABA's
command for lawyers to "act ... with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf," MODEL RULES,
supra note 1, R. 1.3 cmt. para. 1.
28. CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 10.015 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2001).
29. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.1.
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1. Recognizing Categories ofPrincipals
As practitioners gain experience, they develop heuristics for efficient and
effective service by recognizing classes of principals and categories of problems.
Doctors learn to associate patients' symptoms with a diagnosis,3 1 a label that
"organizes [sic] illness: identifying treatment options, predicting outcomes, and
providing an explanatory framework."3 2 Lawyers develop familiarity with a
particular set of legal issues and deftly determine the transactional documents or
legal remedies most appropriate for each client's needs. 33 This is what I term
"routine practice": addressing principals' problems with the standard tools of the
trade.34
As the name suggests, routine practice is characterized by low levels of
uncertainty and no emphasis on creating generalizable knowledge. Low
uncertainty doesn't mean that the work is easy or that practitioners always
achieve their desired ends; it simply indicates that these types of cases present
familiar situations in which the odds of success can be roughly estimated based
on prior experience. Similarly, a lack of any new generalizable knowledge
doesn't mean that routine practice fails to impart valuable experience to the
practitioner; rather, it indicates that this type of work is not intended to produce
generalizable knowledge for the benefit of others. Quite the reverse, in fact:
practitioners may learn their craft and improve their skills by looking to
generalizable knowledge developed by other professionals.
2. The Idiosyncratic Principal
If practice is defined by the furtherance of principals' best interests, then a
31. See Barton Childs et al., A Science of the Individual: Implications for a Medical School
Curriculum, 6 ANN. REV. GENOMICS HuM. GENETICS 313, 316 (2005) ("In general, the doctor's
orientation is toward the likenesses between cases that lead to certainty of diagnosis rather than
differences that may be pointing to heterogeneity and individuality.").
32. Annemarie Jutel, Sociology of Diagnosis: A Preliminary Review, 31 Soc. HEALTH &
ILLNESS 278, 278 (2009).
33. See Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599, 606 (1979)
(explaining that lawyers in publicly funded legal services seemed to respond to a "generalized view
of cases and clients developed prior to encounters with specific individuals"); Stephen Nathanson,
The Role of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 167, 179 (1989) ("For many
legal transactions, prepared plans, such as precedent files, precedent documents, and procedures
checklists, already exist."); Katharine Rosenberry, Organizational Barriers to Creativity in Law
School and the Legal Profession, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 423, 425 (2005) (noting that for "fender-
bender cases[, t]he complaints were very similar, so it was not necessary to be particularly creative
when drafting answers to the complaints.").
34. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 8 (defining traditional professional
practice as "technical expertise put at the disposal of clients [or] patients").
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necessary first step is to define what those interests are. Despite a history of
paternalism, 35 both medicine and law now explicitly endorse a more active
decision-making role for the principal. The agent may outline possible options
and make a recommendation, but ultimately, it is the principal who determines
what a favorable outcome looks like. There is essentially a division of
responsibility: the principal defines the goals of care, while the means of
achieving those goals are primarily left to the agent. 37 Typically, principals' goals
involve straightforward objectives like recovering from an illness or receiving a
favorable verdict at trial, but some principals have more idiosyncratic desires.
Danielle Ofri recounts the curious dilemma faced by Mr. Ray, a man with
severe Tourette's syndrome.38 Ray's medication suppressed his expletive-laden
outbursts, which allowed him to maintain a career, but he complained that the
drug also dampened his improvisational skills as a jazz drummer. Dr. Ofri
indicates that the standard medical response would be to "nod[] sympathetically
about having to take the bad with the good."39 Instead, Ray's doctor worked with
him to devise and test a medication schedule designed to control his disease
during the workdays, but which tapered off on weekends when he played music.
Dr. Ofri lauds the doctor's creativity in "look[ing] beyond the standard
definitions of 'treatment success' and 'medication side-effects."' 4 0
For a similar example in law, consider a defense attorney who must balance
the efficient and certain resolution offered by a plea bargain with the desires of
clients who value their "day in court."4' Margareth Etienne describes clients who
saw testimony as a way to "express themselves," and appreciated their lawyer
35. See Edward Krupat et al., The Practice Orientations of Physicians and Patients: The Effect
of Doctor-Patient Congruence on Satisfaction, 39 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 49, 50 (2000)
(describing "the classic paternalistic doctor-patient relationship in which ... the patient is expected
to defer to the physician's judgement"); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for
Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1150 (1990) (noting concern over "the general
specter of lawyer paternalism").
36. CODE OF MED. ETHICS Opinion 10.01 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1992) ("The patient has the right to
make decisions regarding the health care that is recommended by his or her physician."); MODEL
RULES, supra note 1, 1.2 cmt. para. I ("[T]he lawyer shall consult with the client" regarding "the
means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued," but the client has "the ultimate authority
to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation.").
37. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 2 ("Conventional ... lawyering involves
the deployment of a set of technical skills on behalf of ends determined by the client, not the
lawyer.").




41. See Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of
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"put[ting] on a show" even if they "knew the chances of winning were very, very
low." 42
This type of creative practice introduces non-standard care processes, but is
still firmly within the world of practice because the services, however
unconventional they may be, are entirely devoted to furthering the interests of the
principal.
B. Innovative Practice
The idiosyncratic principal represents an alternative approach within routine
practice because the agent deviates from the profession's standard solution for
the principal's problem. A more substantive deviation involves novel
developments aimed at addressing the common needs of a class of principals. As
agents develop expertise in sorting principals into categories, they may notice
recurring problems for which there is currently no effective solution. An
imaginative professional engages in "innovative practice" by conceiving a novel
solution to a problem that is held in common by a group of patients or clients.43
Jeffrey Katz and colleagues, for example, describe the innovative use of
orthopedic surgery as a palliative tool.44 A 79-year-old woman presented to her
rheumatologist with debilitating hip pain, but she was an unsuitable candidate for
total joint replacement by traditional standards because she also had advanced
cancer. 45 Nonetheless, Dr. Katz's team discussed hip replacement as a way to
improve her quality of life, and the patient expressed "a strong preference for
surgery" despite the increased risks involved and her short expected lifespan.46
She tolerated the procedure well and enjoyed two years of pain relief and
improved mobility before succumbing to cancer.
Both routine practice and innovative practice focus on the needs of
individual principals. What makes this case different from the creative practice of
Mr. Ray's physician in the previous section is its broad applicability. All medical
care is ultimately aimed at promoting patient wellbeing, and recent decades have
seen a trend toward a more subjective, patient-centered conception of what
42. Id.
43. See Nathanson, supra note 33, at 176 ("The more one is familiar with standard solutions,
the better one is able to draw on them" to "develop[] new solutions or options for solving
problems.").
44. See Jeffrey N. Katz et al., Elective Palliative Total Hip Replacement in a Patient with
Lymphoma and Advanced Lung Cancer, 59 ARTHRITIS CARE & REs. 1194 (2008). The authors note
that "[t]otal hip replacement has not traditionally been regarded as a palliative treatment." Id. at
1195.
45. Id. at 1195 ("[D]isorders that threaten overall survival have long been regarded as
contraindications to total joint replacement.").
46. Id. at 1194-95.
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"wellbeing" means.47 Even with that general principle in the background,
however, Mr. Ray's highly personalized pharmacological schedule designed to
accommodate his unique professional and creative pursuits represents a much
more patient-specific care outcome than the hip replacement described by Dr.
Katz.
Terminally ill patients who suffer from treatable chronic conditions are
common in medical practice,4 8 and an encounter with a single patient was enough
for Katz and colleagues to conclude that "a wide range of elective procedures
traditionally contraindicated in patients with terminal illness may in fact be
entirely appropriate when viewed in a palliative care context." 4 9 This type of
extrapolation fits neatly within the Belmont Report's conception of
"generalizable knowledge," particularly since the authors expressed their
conclusion in the language of "theories, principles, and statements of
relationships" that were intended to generalize their experience for a broader
audience and broader applications.so
This observation underscores the true distinguishing feature of innovative
practice. Though some types of routine practice may introduce novel elements,
innovative practice lends itself to the creation of generalizable knowledge, and
the agent may well have those broader concerns in mind while working on behalf
of a particular principal. The principal's welfare remains the primary goal, but
the specific case helps the agent devise new approaches that will benefit like-
situated principals in the future. Section II.C will explore a comparable example
of innovative practice in transactional corporate law, where attorneys "develop[]
new legal devices and strategies to meet the perceived general needs of their
corporate clients."
C. Experimentation
At the far end of the spectrum lies "experimentation," a category of
professional activity dedicated to rigorously testing novel developments in
47. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 2 (1982)
(noting that the duty of informed consent for medical treatment is premised on the twin principles
of patients' "personal well-being and self-determination").
48. Cf Katz et al., supra note 44, at 1195 ("[T]he co-occurrence of advanced cancer and
advanced arthritis is not unusual.").
49. Id. at 1194. The authors also note that their conclusion "raise[s] new questions about the
risks, benefits, costs, and cost effectiveness of such interventions in the palliative care setting." Id.
at 1195.
50. See Belmont Report, supra note 8.
51. Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking,
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technology, process, or doctrine. Formal clinical research is the purest form of
experimentation in medicine. An equivalent activity in the law is impact
litigation brought with the goal of establishing a particular precedent, which I
will discuss in the context of both corporate law and cause lawyering. As in
innovative practice, testing the untested necessarily involves uncertainty; the
defining feature of experimentation is its concrete focus on the pursuit of
generalizable knowledge or impact.52
The two categories examined above carry the label of "practice" because
they ascribe primacy to the interests of the principal. The principal is by no
means irrelevant in experimentation," but has become subsidiary to the interests
of the broad class of individuals to which she belongs. A patient comes to
represent a particular disease profile or a demographic subpopulation; a client
becomes a face for the common legal struggles of a group united by race or
corporate structure. In this relationship, the principals are not autonomous
decision makers who define the goals of care or representation, but rather provide
a vehicle for achieving the agent's goals. 5 4 In effect, the agent shifts the focus of
52. See supra text accompanying notes 1-14. Impact litigation creates knowledge in the
sense of precedent that defines what the law is, as discussed in the introduction. See also William
B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in
Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1632 (1997) (discussing civil rights cases that "are
brought with the intention of establishing a legal precedent that will improve a group's social
situation and thus they aim to have an effect on other pending cases or on future cases"). For these
lawyers, establishing precedent is the ultimate goal, rather than an incidental feature of client
service. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that "cause lawyering is
associated with both intent and behavior").
53. Indeed, identifying and recruiting the appropriate principals can be a major challenge in
clinical research. See, e.g., Marlene H. Peters-Lawrence et al., Clinical Trial Implementation and
Recruitment: Lessons Learned from the Early Closure of a Randomized Clinical Trial, 32
CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 291, 291 (2012) (noting "multiple barriers to patient accrual" that
caused a study to be "terminated early due to low enrollment"). Cause lawyers, meanwhile, not
only hope for clients who serve as a good face for the cause, see, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, Race
Didn't Cost Abigail Fisher Her Spot at the University of Texas, ATLANTIC WIRE, Mar. 18, 2013,
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/03/abigail-fisher-university-texas/63247/ ("When
the NAACP began challenging Jim Crow laws across the South, it... meticulously selected the
people who would elicit both sympathy and outrage, who were pristine in form and character."),
but they must also contend with the threshold of constitutional standing, see U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §
2; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (noting that a plaintiff
"seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large does
not state an Article III case or controversy").
54. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that cause lawyers use
"legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service" because they have broader
social goals in mind); Howard Brody & Franklin G. Miller, The Clinician-Investigator:
Unavoidable but Manageable Tension, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 329, 334 (2003) ("Clinical
medicine is an activity designed to produce therapeutic benefits for individual patients. Clinical
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professional duty from principal to principles.
"Success" here is a trickier concept to define than in the realm of practice,
where the goals of representation are defined by the principal himself. In clinical
research, the goal is to produce meaningful generalizable knowledge with the
potential to improve the processes of care. Measures like methodological rigor
and internally consistent results serve as a proxy for accuracy," an objective
assessment of whether the study actually measures what it purports to measure.
Beyond that, however, researchers also strive for subjectively "good" results,
those with social utility that answer unaddressed questions or that challenge
conventional wisdom with provocative findings.56
Lawyers use impact litigation to change the law, whether on behalf of a
corporate client, a social cause, or an ideological mission. Some judicial
decisions have an immediate impact,57 but many do not, whether because the
verdict simply affirms the status quo or because vague language in support of
abstract legal rights fails to change the situation on the ground. Meanwhile,
each new appellate decision adds a new layer of precedent that helps to shape the
law for future litigants. Many holdings end up being clarified, reinterpreted, or
reaffirmed in subsequent decisions,59 so dedicated lawyers must be vigilant in
ensuring enforcement of the laws they like and challenging the laws they don't.
In both fields, the goals of experimentation are defined by the agents rather
than the principals, though the principals may well share those goals in certain
instances. Though the experimentation may occur within the bounds of the
principal-agent relationship, this type of work dissolves the standard "goals vs.
means" division of responsibilities. Instead, the agent defines both the ends being
pursued and the strategy for pursuing them.
55. See Peter Jiini, Assessing the Quality of Controlled Clinical Trials, 323 BMJ 42 (2001).
56. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), for example, assesses research grant applications
based on a measure of "overall impact" that takes into account factors like "significance" and
"innovation." See Nat'l Insts. Health, NIH Grants Policy Statement, HHS at 1-51 to -52 (Oct. 1,
2012), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2012/nihgps-2012.pdf.
57. Roe v. Wade, for example, was "a moment of high drama. .. because in its wake not a
single state abortion statute remained constitutional." Nan D. Hunter, Lawyering for Social Justice,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997).
58. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 421 (2008) (rejecting the courts as vehicles for social change). But see Hunter, supra note
57 (arguing that litigation complements political mobilization by providing a vocabulary of rights, a
motivational focal point, and salience in the media).
59. See MICHAEL MELTSNER & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS
FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 77 (1974) (noting the extensive rounds of school desegregation
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II. THE Loci OF INNOVATION
At a conceptual level, innovation and experimentation are defined by a
degree of abstraction from the individual needs of specific principals. Beyond the
necessary outlook and intent, however, successful innovations also depend on a
high level of professional expertise60 and on certain requisite resources, both
financial and otherwise. As a result of these pragmatic considerations, innovative
practice and experimentation tend to be concentrated in a small number of
conducive professional practice settings.
The existence of a small community of innovators produces a certain degree
of homogeneity, whether because like-minded individuals are simply drawn to
one another or perhaps due to an acculturation of new arrivals. These
relationships reflect a central tension: professionals collaborate with others in the
interest of furthering shared goals, but they may also feel a competitive urge to
be the first with a new idea or the best in their field. Innovation in medicine aptly
reflects this tension, while the two legal tracks lean in opposite directions. Cause
lawyers tend to band together to prioritize their broader mission, while
experimenting corporate lawyers face heightened competition because their
industry emphasizes profit incentives for both firms and individuals.
A. Medical Innovation in the Ivory Tower
Academic medical centers have traditionally been the main source of
innovation in American medicine. The twin roles of clinical faculty member and
clinical researcher developed in tandem in American medical schools around the
turn of the twentieth century,61 allowing accomplished physicians to build careers
around educating students and advancing the state of knowledge in their area of
specialization. Academia's major role in innovation and research has persisted
because it provides a centralized location for imaginative physicians, as well as
the resources necessary for medical innovation and investigation.
1. Experimentation: Administrative and Financial Support for Clinical
Research
It is widely recognized that clinical trials are primarily concentrated at
60. Okamoto, supra note 16, at 500 ("An expert draws on prior solutions to comparable
problems but ultimately must proffer a novel solution suited to the particular context of the
particular situation."); see also Brody & Miller, supra note 54, at 33 1 (explaining that the
physicians conducting research on a given disease are often those most knowledgeable about it);
Rosenberry, supra note 33, at 427 ("[A] depth of knowledge in [the] field" is "essential for
creativity.").
61. See A. McGEHEE HARVEY, SCIENCE AT THE BEDSIDE: CLINICAL RESEARCH IN AMERICAN
MEDICINE, 1905-1945, at 183 (1981).
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62
academic medical centers. The "supportive clinical research infrastructure" at
these institutions furnishes the key resources of time and money. 63 Academic
researchers are expected to conduct research as part of their job description,
whereas community physicians would have to take time out from private
practice. 6 4 The complexity of compliance with research protocols and regulations
means that "repeat player" institutions benefit from institutional memory and
administrative support for grant applications and protocol review. As for
financial support, many academic institutions fund research activities directly. 6 5
More importantly, however, the availability of advanced facilities, skilled
clinicians, and methodological experts makes the institutional environment
conducive to securing grant funding from outside organizations.6 6
2. Innovative Practice: Broad Mindset and Meaningful Impact
Physicians in all settings must contend with a continuous influx of new
medical knowledge and endless variation in patient profiles. Many respond with
constant adaptations in their practice techniques. 67 These modifications fall into
the category of innovative practice if they are inspired by individual patients, but
pursued with broader goals in mind. Attempting to assess and track innovative
practice is a more challenging endeavor than examining clinical research activity,
however, because innovative practice has hazier boundaries 68 and does not
62. See FORUM ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEV. & TRANSLATION, INST. MED., TRANSFORMING
CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: WORKSHOP
SUMMARY 22 (2010), (noting "[t]he limited involvement of community physicians in clinical
research"); Victor J. Dzau et al., Transforming Academic Health Centers for an Uncertain Future,
369 NEJM 991, 991 (2013) ("Academic health centers (AHCs) have long led the advancement of
science and medicine by pursuing missions of clinical care, research, and education."). But see Lois
Snyder & Paul S. Mueller, Research in the Physician's Office: Navigating the Ethical Minefield, 38
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23, 23 (2008) ("[M]any industry-funded trials [now] take place in physicians'
offices and private testing centers through contract research organizations . . . .") (emphasis added).
63. FORUM ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEV. & TRANSLATION, supra note 62, at 24 (noting that
academic medical centers provide "administrative and financial" support).
64. Id at 23-24.
65. Id. at 24.
66. See Nat'l Insts. Health, supra note 56, at 1-51 to -52 (noting that NIH grant reviewers look
for investigators with "appropriate experience and training," as well as "institutional support,
equipment and other physical resources").
67. See William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, COLUM. L. SCH. REP., Winter 2000, at 60
("[P]hysicians view their daily decisions as demanding constant adaptation and compromise . . . .");
Saumita Saha, Surgical Innovation, 71 INDIAN J. SURGERY 6, 7 (2009) ("Most surgeons have
spontaneously innovated at some point or other.").
68. See Martin F. McKneally & Abdallah S. Daar, Introducing New Technologies: Protecting
Subjects of Surgical Innovation and Research, 27 WORLD J. SURGERY 930, 930 (2003) (noting that
surgeons often find themselves in a "large gray zone" between "an evolutionary variation on a
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necessarily involve rigorous documentation or publication of results. Still, these
clinical innovations may be more probable in academic settings, and are most
likely to be widely noticed when developed or adopted there.
The academic environment emphasizes a broad and forward-thinking
outlook: medical faculty members impart generalized knowledge to students, and
medical researchers create generalizable knowledge in their studies. Physicians in
academic institutions often take on at least one of these roles at least some of the
time, and are constantly surrounded by people who perform both. 9 In this
context, "expertise" consists of technical proficiency with the clinical craft, as
well as the requisite imaginative capacity and broad perspective to innovate on
behalf of a population of patients.
Moreover, academic physicians who innovate are best situated to
disseminate new information and to formally test novel developments in clinical
trials. Prior to the modem era of clinical research regulation,7 0 many critically
important developments in medicine arose "through an informal, unregulated
innovation process,"71 typically at the hands of an academically affiliated
physician.72 This may be due to the ways in which academic centers attract
creative individuals and encourage innovative work. It could also be an issue of
sampling bias, since innovations developed in private practice are less likely to
be noticed and promoted than those arising out of well-connected academic
centers.73 Nonetheless, it seems plausible that both medical innovation and
experimentation are anchored in academic medical centers. The two activities are
inherently linked, since one may well lead to the other, and both are facilitated by
the nexus of technology, funding, and interdisciplinary expertise.
69. See Mehmet Toner & Ronald G. Tompkins, Invention, Innovation, Entrepreneurship in
Academic Medical Centers, 143 SURGERY 168, 170 (2008) ("[T]he top academic medical centers
have expertise in basic biological science, technology, and clinical medicine.. ., which creates a
very unique and truly multidisciplinary environment for innovation.").
70. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ("Common Rule"),supra note 10
(noting that the current regulatory regime was "heavily influenced" by the Belmont Report, written
in 1979). Subsection IV.A.1, infra, discusses the history of clinical research regulations in more
detail.
71. McKneally & Daar, supra note 68, at 930. This "unregulated process" is responsible for
"[m]ost of the important advances in the history of medicine, such as anesthesia, appendectomy,
antibiotics, intensive care, and immunization." Id.
72. See, e.g., Joseph Ben-David, Roles and Innovation in Medicine, 65 AM. J. Soc. 557, 557
(1960) (noting that medical innovations have often been developed by "practitioners who were
involved in research and academic teaching"); Shuai Xu et al., Origins of Medical Innovation: The
Case of Coronary Artery Stents, 5 J. AM. HEART Ass'N 743, 743 (2012) ("Coronary artery stent
technology first arose from individual physician-inventors within academic medical centers and
their associated private companies.").
73. See Riskin et al., supra note 15, at 690 (noting that community physicians may not have
"the intellectual interaction and academic connections necessary to have [their] invention noticed").
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3. Motivation: OfPatients, Pride, and Profits
Physicians may be motivated by a number of factors to pursue novel
developments in medicine. There is the obvious goal of improving care for
patients, and indeed, innovation seems to foster collaboration to that end.
Physicians and researchers from different institutions may work together on new
studies7 4 or visit each other's practices to learn novel techniques." Professional
societies organized around particular methodologies and diseases can "establish
standards and serve as forums for the discussion of new work." 7 6
It would be naive, however, to neglect other, less altruistic potential
motivations, such as the pursuit of prestige and professional advancement. 77
Commentators have also noted the potential for heightened competition driven by
- 78increasingly important external private interests in medical innovation. At a
time of dwindling government support for medical research, the medical device
and pharmaceutical industries offer handsome compensation to physicians who
assist in developing new products for commercial gain.80 The goals of medical
innovation may also shift as modem health reform continues to emphasize cost
reduction and quality standards.81
74. See FORUM ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEV. & TRANSLATION, supra note 62, at 8-9 (praising
long-term collaboration agreements in clinical research networks).
75. See McKneally & Daar, supra note 68, at 932.
76. See HARVEY, supra note 61, at 128.
77. See Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts ofInterest in Research, 347 NEJM 759,
759 (2002) (noting "nonfinancial conflicts of interest" in clinical research including "personal
benefits from publications and acquisition of grants"); see also HARVEY, supra note 61, at 59
(explaining that competition has always been present in academic medicine because "[s]uccessful
scientists were rewarded with university chairs and facilities"); Riskin et al., supra note 15, at 688.
78. See, e.g., McKneally & Daar, supra note 68, at 932; see also William J. Broad,
Billionaires with Big Ideas Are Privatizing American Science, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/science/billionaires-with-big-ideas-are-privatizing-american-
science.html (noting that wealthy philanthropists account for a growing share of research funding,
and their "personal setting of priorities . . . troubles some in the science establishment").
79. See Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH Details Impact of2013 Sequester Cuts, SCIENCE: SCIENCEINSIDER
(May 8, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2013/05/nih-details-impact-of-
2013-seque.html.
80. See Levinsky, supra note 77, at 759 (noting "[t]he dramatic growth of relations between
investigators and industry"). Financial conflicts of interest are a perennial topic of concern in both
clinical trials and medical practice. See generally Sheila R. Shulman & Andrea Kuettel, Drug
Development and the Public Health Mission: Collaborative Challenges at the FDA, NIH, and
Academic Medical Centers, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 663 (2005) (reviewing the recent history of
regulations and institutional policies on conflicts of interest at federal agencies, private companies,
and universities). See also Shantanu Agrawal et al., The Sunshine Act-Effects on Physicians, 368
NEJM 2054 (2013).
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B. Public Interest Law: Ideological Commitment as a Non-Financial "Resource"
Cause lawyers often pursue their ideological goals through the courts rather
than (or in addition to) the legislature. Their work is thus inherently innovative,
since they seek social change within the existing legal framework by
reinterpreting or striking down existing laws. This activity goes beyond settling
individual matters for individual clients, and targets broad visions of progress by
changing what the law is or what the law means. By organizing around particular
issues, cause lawyers build expertise and institutional memory. Their relationship
with "resources," however, is slightly more complex.
Public interest law organizations typically operate under tight financial
constraints: they are often not reimbursed directly from their work, 8 2 and they
engage in "non-revenue-generating" activities like coalition building, media
work, community outreach, and education. 83 Many are registered non-profits, and
they build their budgets around private contributions and public funds.84 The
following examples illustrate how cause lawyers leverage limited financial inputs
and non-monetary resources to further their missions.
1. Innovative Practice: Public Defenders and Direct Client Representation
Criminal defense and legal aid are public interest models based on direct
client service rather than impact litigation. Nonetheless, client-service attorneys
often have "strong ideological and political beliefs that they seek to effectuate
through their work."85 They engage in innovative practice to the extent that they
"represent individuals, but over time tend to think of these individuals as a
class." 86
Margareth Etienne describes a group of public defenders who noted a trend
among their Spanish-speaking and bilingual clients: those with rudimentary
English proficiency were typically read their Miranda rights in English, leaving
some of them bewildered and uninformed. The attorneys acknowledged that
82. They may, however, receive attorney's fees in certain types of cases. See Catherine R.
Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund
Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 62, 75-76 (2014)
(reporting that public interest law organizations received an average of 5% of their budgets from
attorney's fees).
83. Id. at 62-63.
84. See id. at 76 (noting in Figure 2 that the budgets of public interest law organizations, on
average, depended primarily on public funds and donations from foundations and individuals).
Scheingold and Sarat note that public agencies and public interest organizations are the "classic
sites" for cause lawyers to practice, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 80, but that cause
lawyers can also be found in corporate pro bono programs and in small law firms, id. at 73.
85. Etienne, supra note 41, at 1226.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1240.
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this practice likely fell within the bounds of the "law on the books," but together,
they "devised a strategy to change the 'law on the streets.'"8 At any trial with a
Spanish-speaking or bilingual defendant, they made it a habit to inquire whether
the Miranda rights had been read in Spanish. 89 It is unlikely that this simple
question altered the outcome in any individual case, 90 but over time, it became
standard practice for law enforcement officials to read the rights in both
languages to avoid any potential complications at trial.9 1
One attorney acting alone would likely not have had much of an impact on
the system, but the public defenders drew on the "resource" of a community
united by a particular cause in order to affirmatively pursue a shared mission of
generalizable impact. Still, the defenders never lost sight of their role as
practitioners; they considered broader change to be a subsidiary goal and only
pursued it to the extent that it would not negatively affect the day-to-day work of
helping individual defendants.
2. Experimentation: Impact Litigation
Impact litigation can be a powerful tool in creating social change, but it can
also be a protracted and expensive endeavor as lawyers shepherd a case through
multiple courts over a number of years, often while also coordinating an
associated media campaign. The public defenders in the last example built
strength from within their own branch of the profession, coordinating laterally
across offices; litigation-oriented public interest organizations, on the other hand,
typically draw on ideological sympathies to marshal support from external
sources.
Public interest organizations often draw their arguments from recent
developments in academic legal thought, and law professors may be called upon
to help with developing briefs, mooting oral arguments, or even arguing cases. 92
Similarly, private attorneys who sympathize with the goals of a test case may
provide pro bono assistance. 93 These lawyers may contribute appellate
experience, local knowledge, or legal advice for facets of the case that fall
outside the cause lawyers' areas of expertise.94 Corporate pro bono programs can
88. Id. at 1240-41.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1242 ("The strategy was viewed as a harmless one even though the defendants in the
cases in which it was used would not receive a benefit.").
91. Id. Not only did Spanish-speaking law enforcement officials begin routinely providing the
Miranda rights in Spanish, but non-Spanish-speaking officials started carrying wallet-sized cards
with a Spanish translation of the rights. Id.
92. See infra notes 96 and 97.
93. See Rubenstein, supra note 52, at 1633.
94. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Our Better Half A Public Interest Lawyer Reflects on Pro
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also offer traditional legal resources like research support and a physical
workspace, costs that may exceed a public interest organization's budget.9 5
Lawrence v. Texas96 and Griswold v. Connecticut97 were high-profile cases that
emerged out of these types of collaboration.
The government is a popular target for test cases, which may target statutes,
public benefit schemes, or individual actions by public officials. In some
instances, the singular focus and intensive preparation of the cause lawyers is met
with a relatively lackluster defense from the state's attorneys, for whom the case
is but one of their many responsibilities. 98 In some instances, however,
government officials may themselves be sympathetic with the cause lawyers'
mission; they may fulfill their role out of a sense of duty, but do what they can to
assist in moving the case along.99 In cases like these, the "resource" of
ideological sympathy extends across ostensibly adversarial lines, drawing
assistance and support from law enforcement or judicial officials in furthering the
innovative goal.
(2001) (describing a women's rights group that received pro bono assistance in navigating the
bankruptcy court system).
95. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 74.
96. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring the unconstitutionality of state prohibitions on homosexual
sodomy). For an in-depth overview of the case and its social context, see DALE CARPENTER,
FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012). The national LGBT rights
organization Lambda Legal was involved in the case from the beginning, but relied on private local
attorneys to help them "navigate[] the lower-court minefield of Texan justice." Id. at 130. Lambda
chose legal arguments about sex-based classifications that had "long been a favorite of legal
academics," id. at 156, and law professors were actively involved in helping the attorneys prepare
for the case, id. at 213. The case was argued in the Supreme Court by a pro bono attorney with
extensive Supreme Court experience. Id. at 211.
97. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a constitutional right for married couples to access birth
control). Yale Law School Professor Fowler Harper was a "principal legal strategist" for the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut in the 1950s and 1960s as it planned a legal assault on
anti-contraception laws. JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CoNNECTIcUTr BIRTH CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 39 (2005). As Harper's health declined, his Yale colleague
Thomas Emerson, an experienced appellate advocate, took over leadership of the case. See id. at
103-05.
98. See CARPENTER,supra note 96, at 214-16; JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 116.
99. See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 145-46 (noting that the Texas prosecutor assigned
to the sodomy case was a lesbian; she "did not go out of her way to create difficulties for the
defense team, and assisted it in understanding the procedures of the county criminal court");
JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 81-83 (noting that Planned Parenthood personnel were permitted to
"essentially write the script for the arrest" by cooperative police officials); see also Lyle Denniston,
Constitution Check: Must Government Lawyers Defend Laws They Deem to Be Invalid?,
CONSTITUTION DAILY (Feb. 25, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/02/constitution-
check-must-government-lawyers-defend-laws-they-deem-to-be-invalid/ (discussing state and
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3. Motivation: Priority on Principles
The typical cause lawyer is a person who decided to pursue social justice
rather than a potentially lucrative career in private practice. 00 Given this
framework of self-sacrifice and dedication, it should come as no surprise that
cause lawyers tend to work together in furthering their mission. The preceding
subsections discuss collaboration within organizations and with external
supporters, but there is also typically a high level of coordination across public
interest organizations on questions like long-term legal strategy and client
selection.' Disputes do arise between individual attorneys or rival organizations
over points of legal strategy or issues of attribution and leadership,102 but the
overall tenor may often be one of collaboration rather than competition.
C. Corporate Law: On-the-Ground Expertise
The foregoing sections outline a top-down approach to innovation that often
involves academic experts, who either do the innovating themselves or take a
supportive role. In this section, we trace a second track of innovation in law that
is rooted in private practice. These novel developments "are not the products of
law professors or researchers so much as the work of lawyers striving to further
the interests of their clients," representing a "bottom-up process of lawmaking
and knowledge production."' 0 3 This client-centered model is similar to the
innovative practice of the public defenders discussed in Subsection II.B.1. The
main difference is the identity of the clients: public defenders innovate on behalf
of indigent clients, while innovation in private practice typically benefits wealthy
corporate entities.
100. Typically, public interest lawyers have affirmatively chosen to pursue that career rather
than falling into it as a back-up option. As compared to private practice, public interest positions
are fewer in number, lower-paying, and less likely to be widely advertised or coordinated by a
dedicated recruitment team. See generally Career Dev. Office, Public Interest Careers, YALE L.
SCH. 11-14 (Sept. 2013), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/CDOPublic/CDOPI Careers
.Public.pdf.
101. See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 128 (explaining that several national LGBT rights
groups met semiannually "to share information about cases, discuss strategies, and coordinate
efforts as much as possible"); Rubenstein, supra note 52, at 1629 (describing a "conference that the
NAACP held in Chicago in 1945 to help coordinate the many restrictive covenant cases that were
percolating throughout the country").
102. See Rubenstein, supra note 52, at 1626 (describing the challenges of using individual
litigation to create social change on behalf of a community, including "[c]ommunity member
disputes concerning the goals of litigation" and "attorney disputes about the methods of litigation");
id. at 1627-31 (noting Thurgood Marshall's frustration with attorney George Vaughn, who bristled
at comporting with the NAACP's carefully orchestrated strategy to challenge racially restrictive
covenants).
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1. Innovative Practice: Creative Solutions for Corporate Clients
The practice of law has become increasingly segregated along lines defined
by categories of clients. Solo practitioners and small firms tend to represent
individual clients and small businesses, while bigger firms more often focus on
corporate clients and very wealthy individuals.10 4 As clients' wealth increases, so
does the complexity of their legal issues.' 05 Big businesses certainly have many
straightforward legal needs,' 0 6 but they often rely on "the counsel of specialists in
those areas of practice that are relatively new or are characterized by a high
degree of uncertainty." 0 7 Disruptive innovations are concentrated among a small
number of elite firms that attract graduates from top schools and clients who are
willing to pay top dollar for their unique services. 1o These firms also have the
necessary resources for the intensive background research that may be required
for developing new legal devices that need to withstand judicial challenge.
Academia is conspicuously absent from this description of corporate
innovative practice. The ivory tower played an important role in medical
innovation and cause lawyering, and there are certainly instances where legal
academics perform a similar function in the world of corporate law and financial
regulation.109 In general, though, academia plays a more peripheral role in this
sphere.110 During the wave of hostile corporate takeovers in the 1980s, for
104. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal Education and the Rise and
Fall of Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 863, 869 (2006/07).
105. Compare id. at 887 ("[T]he work of attorneys representing individuals is almost all
legally routine."), with Milton C. Regan, Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 207 (2000) ("The rapid pace of change in the corporate world demands
that lawyers create new legal forms and arrangements."), and Eric Mankin, Innovation in Practice:
Why It's So Hard, 32 L. PRAc. 42, 42 (2006) ("Law firms introduce new legal services and products
on an ongoing basis as part of their work with sophisticated clients in industries such as
entertainment and financial services.").
106. See George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 Bus. LAw 279,
318 (2009).
107. Powell, supra note 51, at 450.
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83, 121-22 (2013)
(noting that "academics have generated at least a few examples of contractual innovations"); Ward
Farnsworth, The Legal Academy and the Profession, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES
6 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) ("A number of important ideas in antitrust law were
pressed by scholars in the 1960s and 1970s and then adopted fairly quickly by courts," which the
author describes as "an exceptional case where the impact [of legal scholarship] has been large.");
Lee Fang, The Scholars Who Shill for Wall Street, THE NATION, Nov. 11, 2013,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176809/scholars-who-shill-wall-street (explaining that legal
academics' studies and opinions that critique financial regulations are increasingly being relied on,
solicited, and even paid for by large corporations).
I 10. See, e.g., Clair A. Hill, Introduction: Theory Informs Business Practice, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 3, 3 (2001) ("In my years as a corporate law academic, I've been surprised at the paucity of
interactions between those who study corporate law and those who 'do' it."). Indeed, the corpus of
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example, a variety of documents were produced detailing the increasingly
complex range of options for takeover strategies and defenses."' These guides
were typically authored by "expert practitioners, not academics."ll 2
The "most significant and controversial of the several new defensive
antitakeover devices" was the shareholder rights plan, known as the "poison
pill."" 3 The device was conceived by Wachtell Lipton Rosen Katz, one of "the
dominant legal players in the hostile takeover game,"" 4 in the midst of a
"desperate takeover struggle" for one of its clients." 5 Soon, however, the firm
began recommending the pill as a protective measure for its other clients, and
continued to add or modify features of the basic plan. This development
proceeded "independent of the particular needs of ... any . . . particular client.
The firm was developing and refining the new legal device much as a
manufacturing company might modify a new product after an initial market
test."' In this way, the firm's representation of an individual client served the
dual purpose of supporting the client's specific business objectives, as well as
building generalizable knowledge in the field of antitakeover defenses.
2. Experimentation: Litigation Arising Out ofPractice
The process of introducing and tweaking the poison pill falls under the
category of innovative practice because it constituted "private lawmaking on
behalf of clients and in the course of [the] practice of law."" 7 However, any
novel development in practice has the potential to be carried through into
experimentation if challenged in court. Corporate attorneys who successfully
legal academia as a whole is often critiqued for being too disconnected from the real world of legal
practice. See Farnsworth, supra note 109, at I (noting that legal academics "usually see little sign
that anything they write is valued by the legal system or makes an impact on it"); id. at 7
("[C]ommonly, hot academic fads are driven by or accompany a politics unpalatable to the legal
system."); Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html ("Law
reviews are not really meant to be read. They mostly exist as a way for law schools to evaluate law
professors for promotion and tenure.").
111. See Powell, supra note 51, at 448. The ensuing discussion focuses on Michael Powell's
description of the firms involved in corporate takeover work in the 1980s, one of the
"comparatively few" studies on the "process of innovation" in private law. Kettering, supra note
15, at 1554-55, 1555 n.2.
112. Powell, supra note 51, at 448.
113. See id. at 429. The poison pill established certain new shareholder rights that were
contingent upon outside companies acquiring a certain percentage of stock. The rights were
intended both to protect minority shareholders and to encourage the acquiring company to enter
into negotiations early in the process. See id. at 435.
114. Id. at 433.
115. Id. at 434.
116. Id. at 436-37.
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defend an innovation in court while assisting a particular client can thereby
establish the innovation's legitimacy more broadly for use with other clients.Is
This is ultimately what occurred with the poison pill, with the Delaware
Supreme Court defying expectations by officially sanctioning the device in
1985.119 Though the case concerned a single company's use of a shareholder
rights plan to avert a hostile takeover, "the wider debate was couched in terms of
[the] central social and economic values that were seen to be involved," 2 0 just as
cause lawyers often abstract away from their clients and focus on broader themes
of social justice.' 21 Throughout this process, it was the "expert practitioners who
[were] actively engaged in developing and reworking the law," with legal
academics relegated to the position of "commentators and critics." 22
3. Motivation: Priority on Profit
Private law firms' motivation to innovate likely has less to do with an
idealized notion of what corporate law should look like and more to do with
pragmatic concerns about acquiring and retaining clients. 123 Rather than
responding to the needs of clients as they arrive, entrepreneurial firms proactively
"develop[] new legal devices and strategies to meet the perceived general needs
of their corporate clients" and market those innovations to drum up business.12 4
This process plays out at a micro level within firms as well, since individual
attorneys must compete with each other to bring in new clients and establish rank
in the firm. 125
Competition between and within firms has intensified in recent years in
response to an increasingly globalized market with sophisticated and cost-
conscious clients.12 6 The disaggregation and specialization of legal services and
118. Id. at 429 ("If challenged and upheld by the courts [new practices or devices] become
institutionalized in the common law.").
119. See id. at 438-39 (discussing Moran v. Household International Inc., 490 A.2d 1059
(Del. Ch. 1985), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)).
120. Id. at 438.
121. See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 194 (noting that oral arguments in Lawrence v.
Texas focused on the language of liberty and due process, and never explicitly mentioned sex or
referred to the defendants by name); Rubenstein, supra note 52, at 1630-31 (describing how an
unsophisticated lawyer cut through the technical legal arguments concerning restrictive covenants
in a rousing peroration about racial equality).
122. Powell, supra note 51, at 448-49.
123. See id. at 447 (explaining that large firms in the 1980s "competed with each other over
what exactly constituted the best legal product" for deterring hostile takeovers).
124. Id.; see also id. at 442 ("Skadden Arps did not sit back and wait for clients to call but
rather took the initiative to develop and promote its own plan, which it was careful to differentiate
from other competing plans.").
125. See id. at 427; Regan, supra note 105, at 198.
126. See William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have
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the rise of in-house legal counsel put additional pressure on firms to innovate on
behalf of their corporate clients.12 7 To justify their high rates, they must add
value beyond handling routine legal paperwork.
III. THE NATURE OF "TRUTH" IN MEDICINE AND LAW
Scientific experimentation does not proceed in a haphazard or lackadaisical
fashion. While innovative practice may occur spontaneously as practitioners
attempt to grapple with the problems presented to them, true experimentation is a
more deliberate and deliberative endeavor. "[Tihe structure of scientific
experiments is fundamentally stable all across the basic-clinical spectrum," and
involves a number of well-established steps for defining a hypothesis and
research methods.12 8 Lawyers who bring test cases employ similarly rigorous
methods in their attempts to experiment with the law through litigation.12 9
However, important differences arise out of the structure of the American legal
system, highlighting a major divergence in what is otherwise a remarkably
similar set of processes for innovation shared by the two professions.
Notably, though both professions use a carefully defined representation of
reality as a starting point for their experiments, they diverge in the extent to
which they strive for accuracy. Clinical research aims to uncover objective
scientific facts. A new treatment will likely be ineffective if its creators have
inaccurately assessed the nature of the disease or the biological mechanism
targeted for intervention. In the law, however, academics and judges alike have
moved away from a strict conception of fixed, objective "natural" law, and
toward a more nuanced view of judicial decision making as influenced by
Started Before the Recession-And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011),
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/paradigm-shift/ (describing the "massive structural
shift" in the legal profession); Regan, supra note 105, at 197-99 ("Competition among law firms
for both clients and lawyers has intensified.").
127. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 1/S: J.L. & POL'Y
1, 19 (2012) ("What the new economy enterprise needs from law is not just more of what the old
economy enterprise needed; it needs things that are different."). The importance of innovation as a
business strategy has led some to wonder about the possibility or desirability of patents on novel
legal methods and strategies. See generally Stephanie L. Varela, Damned if You Do, Doomed if You
Don't: Patenting Legal Methods and Its Effect on Lawyers' Professional Responsibilities, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 1145 (2008).
128. Joffe & Miller, supra note 4, at 34. These authors note that the scientific method has been
fairly stable for over 100 years. Id. They outline the defining features of a scientific experiment as
"(1) articulation of the research question or hypothesis; (2) specification of the experimental
materials; (3) identification of the intervention under study; (4) stipulation of the experimental
conditions . .. ; and (5) description of the methods for measuring study outcomes and other study
data." Id.
129. Cf MELTSNER & SCHRAG, supra note 59, at 78 ("[M]any successful test cases are planned
with great care."). Like scientists, the lawyers craft a hypothesis and devise a legal methodology in
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ideology, temperament, and non-legal "policy" considerations.' 3 0 Lawyers
recognize the malleability and variability of legal "truths" across judges and over
time, and incorporate that same malleability into their arguments to present the
version of the case they think is most likely to sway the decision maker.
Undoubtedly, the two professions take opposite perspectives on the
importance of fidelity to reality in their experimental set-ups. Both professions
converge, however, on the challenges of translating innovations and experimental
outcomes into the anticipated broader social benefit.
A. Negotiating Fact and Fiction
1. Practice: Emphasis on the Principal Means Adherence to Reality
In both medicine and law, agents learn to sort principals into categories as
they attempt to determine the cause of this patient's distress and the cause of
action best suited to that client's problem.'3 ' This distillation leaves some
commentators concerned about the extent to which we reduce the rich and varied
experience of health and illness into lists of diagnoses and quantified biomarkers,
or compress complex social structures and human narratives of struggle into
bare-bones fact patterns and enumerated causes of action.' 32 Ultimately, though,
practitioners are ethically beholden to each principal's needs as defined by the
principal,13 3 meaning that any narrowing that occurs is in the service-and under
the supervision-of the person whose identity is being narrowed. Professionals
engaged in innovative practice may be mindful of the broader effects of novel
developments, but they never lose sight of ensuring the successful resolution of
each principal's individual case.
In experimentation, on the other hand, the principal is meant to be subsumed
into the class of individuals that she represents. Professionals must smooth over
individual distinctions and variations to discover generalizable medical truths and
secure generalizable legal impacts. Here we see a divergence between medicine
and law in the methods and motivations of experimentation.
130. See, e.g., Note, Natural Law for Today's Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REv. 455, 455 (1957).
131. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1995) (decrying "the chasm separating what those clients told
me about their lives and what I wrote to the court as factual allegations in the complaint-sterile
recitations of dates and events that lost so much in the translation"). See generally Note, The
Plaintiff as Person: Cause Lawyering, Human Subject Research, and the Secret Agent Problem,
119 HARv. L. REV. 1510, 1516-17 (2006) (discussing the concept of "narrative surrender" in law
and medicine) [hereinafter The Plaintiffas Person].
133. See supra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text.
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2. Clinical Research: Distortion Avoidance
Clinical researchers strive for accuracy in their results, since success is
defined in part by how closely the study captures the real-life etiology of disease
or mechanisms of recovery. The research community has long recognized the
existence of bias'3 4 and the limits of imperfect measurements.' 35 Researchers
make every effort to minimize these distortions through rigorous study design,136
account for them in statistical methodology, 137 and acknowledge them in their
publications. 138 In striving for accuracy, researchers engage in distortion
avoidance, seeking to minimize any differences between their reported results
and the reality those results purportedly describe.
3. Impact Litigation: Purposive Distortion
Litigators, by contrast, engage in purposive distortion. They selectively
suppress and emphasize different aspects of the record, presenting the case as
they'd like it to be perceived by judge, jury, and general public. Certain legal
fictions are simply a fact of life, familiar common law heuristics roughly
superimposed on reality for the sake of consistent and workable judicial
decisions.' 39 Other distortions, however, may be introduced intentionally to
present a compelling narrative or elicit certain questions of law.
In the book Flagrant Conduct,14 0 Dale Carpenter recounts the events leading
134. See generally STEPHEN B. HULLEY ET AL., DESIGNING CLINICAL RESEARCH (2011). The
authors note that "chance, bias and confounding can all be reasons why a real association might be
missed or underestimated." Id. at 141. They discuss sources of bias and error including
confounding factors, id. at 132, the placebo effect, id. at 149, and self-reported questionnaires, id. at
9.
135. See Donald L. Patrick & Richard A. Deyo, Generic and Disease-Specific Measures in
Assessing Health Status and Quality of Life, 27 MED. CARE at S217, S225 (1989) (describing the
requisite properties of a high-quality measurement tool, including "validity, reliability,
responsiveness, effect size analysis, and generalizability").
136. See, e.g., HULLEY ET AL., supra note 134, at 45 (discussing double-blind trials as a
solution to differential bias).
137. See, e.g., id. at 139 (discussing statistical adjustment to account for confounding factors).
138. Peer-reviewed studies typically include a "limitations" section that explicitly enumerates
potential sources of error, which serves as a note of caution about putting too much faith in any one
study's results. See, e.g., JAMA Instructions for Authors, JAMA (last updated Mar. 11, 2014),
https://jamajamanetwork.com/public/instructionsForAuthors.aspx (requiring original research
submissions to include "a comment section placing the results in context with the published
literature and addressing study limitations").
139. For several examples of legal fictions and an overview of recent theoretical perspectives
on the subject, see Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1,
1-5(2010).
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up to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,141 which declared the
unconstitutionality of state anti-sodomy laws. The Texas statute regulated sexual
conduct, but the Lambda Legal attorneys and their pro bono and academic allies
crafted legal arguments that emphasized intimate personal relationships and the
importance of family.14 2 These themes were echoed and codified in Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion. 143 According to Carpenter's research, however, the
two men arrested for violating the Texas law were neither in a romantic
relationship, nor had they even engaged in the alleged sexual activity.144 For the
purposes of challenging the law, all that mattered was that John Lawrence and
Tyron Garner were arrested in the right place at the right time for the right
reasons. Their attorneys entered a plea of "no contest" to preserve a clean factual
record, 14 5 then "abstracted away" from specific acts and specific defendants into
lofty rhetoric about liberty and due process.146
Important decisions on emotionally fraught subjects like civil liberties often
depend on lawyers' ability to successfully transcend the facts of the dispute at
issue and redefine the case in terms of core social values that will resonate with
the court and the general public.147 Similarly, litigators in momentous corporate
cases are likely to speak about economic principles and impact beyond the
specific decision.14 8 Here again we see innovative lawyers ascribing primacy to
principles over principals, and judges are often willing to play along with the
kabuki theater of an individual case when all parties are aware that broader social
reform is at stake.149
141. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
142. CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 193 (explaining how "the advocates distanced themselves
from the actual circumstances" of the arrest and focused on the concepts of intimacy, relationships,
privacy, and family).
143. Id. at 259-60; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring.").
144. See CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 104 (summarizing the many reasons supporting the
author's contention that "there is no reason . . . to believe that there was any actual sex in the U.S.
Supreme Court's heralded sexual freedom decision"). The two men arrested for homosexual
conduct later denied it, and there were stark inconsistencies in the reports of the two sheriffs
deputies who claimed to have observed the act. See id. at 61-74.
145. See id. at 131 (describing the no contest plea as a "clean option").
146. Id. at 247. During the hour of oral arguments at the Supreme Court, no one mentioned the
words "anal sex" or "oral sex," nor did anyone refer to either of the defendants by name. Id. The
lawyers opted for a "strategy . .. to shine a harsh light on the Texas law rather than focus on the
defendants." Id.
147. See supra note 121.
148. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 51, at 429 (describing the Delaware case that judicially
sanctioned the poison pill).
149. See CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 140 (explaining how the defendants in Lawrence
persuaded a Texas judge to increase the size of the fine levied against them in order to satisfy the
monetary threshold for appeal). But see JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 47 (noting that some Justices on
325
30
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 14 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol14/iss2/2
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
B. Outcomes, Implementation, and Adoption
Innovative professionals are motivated at least in part by the hope of an
impact beyond the particular patient or client. However, the outcome of an
individual instance of innovation or experimentation may not have a direct link
with that broader social purpose. Practicing physicians and lawyers are notorious
for their resistance to change,' 50 an admirable trait to the extent that adherence to
old habits protects principals from risk and uncertainty, but one that may also
delay the adoption of potentially beneficial new technologies and techniques.
This section examines various mechanisms by which novel developments expand
outward from the small communities of innovation outlined in Part II to become
part of professional practice more generally. The previous section explained that
the fields of medicine and law engender different approaches to factual accuracy
in experimentation. These divergent notions of veracity continue to play a role in
explaining how novel ideas and techniques are disseminated through each
profession.
1. Medicine: Evidence and Guidelines
New ideas and implements developed in medical practice are often adopted
and adapted early on by other innovators.15 1 Innovations that survive this stage
generally follow one of two paths toward broader use. Some new developments
are "perceived to have such profound benefits that they [are] introduced and
widely disseminated without proper evaluation" in clinical trials.15 2 These
innovations may ultimately live up to the high expectations,'" but some later
turn out to be "ineffective or even harmful." 5 4 Meanwhile, novel techniques and
tools that do not enjoy widespread adoption early on may undergo formal clinical
trials, but even highly favorable results at this stage may fail to overcome the
the Supreme Court found offensive the idea of "contrived litigation" dedicated to vindicating
abstract principles).
150. See Riskin et al., supra note 15, at 691 ("Health care has been described as the most
entrenched, change-averse industry in the United States."); Rosenberry, supra note 33, at 456
(discussing "organizational barriers to creativity in law schools and the legal profession").
151. See, e.g., Riskin et al., supra note 15, at 689 ("Since some surgeons are technologically
savvy and relish new technology, they are often early adopters.").
152. Saha, supra note 67, at 7.
153. Id. (citing the examples of laparoscopic cholecystectomy, organ transplantation and joint
replacements).
154. Id. (citing prefrontal lobotomy for schizophrenia and radical mastectomy for breast
cancer); accord McKneally & Daar, supra note 68, at 930 (citing radical mastectomy and routine
tonsillectomy); Christina Reith et al., Randomized Clinical Trials-Removing Unnecessary
Obstacles, 369 NEJM 1061, 1061 (2013) (citing "treatment with anti-arrhythmic drugs after heart
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155 15
inertia of traditional practice or the fear of malpractice liability. 56
It seems that both paths toward acceptance proceed apace irrespective of the
formal evidence base, with the existence or non-existence of new clinical trials
having little immediate impact. Leaders in medicine and public health have
become increasingly vocal in their support for evidence-based medicine,
imploring physicians to adhere to best practices and restructuring processes of
care to establish evidence-based default clinical pathways.' 57 Despite these
exhortations, the data continue to show wide variation in utilization rates for
various procedures15 8 and frequent disregard for evidence-based best practices. 159
Blue ribbon panels may articulate clinical guidelines based on hard data from
155. See Chris Degeling, Fractured Hips: Surgical Authority, Futility, and Innovation in
Nineteenth Century Medicine, 33 ENDEAVOUR 128, 132 (2009) ("[S]ometimes the introduction and
validation of new forms of evidence is not sufficient to alter the inertia of long-accepted surgical
practices."); Jacky Swan et al., The Object of Knowledge: The Role of Objects in Biomedical
Innovation, 60 Hum. REL. 1809, 1810 (2007) ("[E]ven where the application of scientific
knowledge to new treatments has been 'proven' through clinical trials, uptake rates are sometimes
poor, as it can be difficult to convince medical and health practitioners to change their existing
practices.").
156. See Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive
Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIx 423, 426 (2009) ("American case law does not appear
directly to have addressed the problem of malpractice risk associated with innovative new
technology use."). States vary in their methods for defining the standard of care, but "all versions of
the malpractice standard are ultimately based on an evaluation of the appropriateness of a
physician's conduct, by comparison to what reasonable physicians either do, or should do, in
similar circumstances." Id. at 430. Innovation is, by definition, a deviation from the standard of
care. A successful innovation is cause for celebration, but a deviation that harms a patient is a
potential cause of action. In that sense, clinical research regulations serve a protective function:
IRB review and informed consent can shield physician-researchers from liability when they test out
carefully planned deviations from the standard of care. See infra notes 186-190 and accompanying
text.
157. See Jerry Avom, Healing the Overwhelmed Physician, N.Y. TIMES, June I1, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/opinion/healing-the-overwhelmed-physician.html (explaining
how medical organizations can play a "'curation' role" by distilling clinical evidence into practice
guidelines); see also Martin Roland, Linking Physicians' Pay to the Quality of Care-A Major
Experiment in the United Kingdom, 351 NEJM 1448, 1449 (2004) ("The 1990s were the years of
evidence-based medicine, when health professionals gradually came to accept that there were better
and worse ways of doing things.").
158. See Joseph P. Newhouse & Alan M. Garber, Geographic Variation in Medicare Services,
368 NEJM 1465, 1468 (2013).
159. See J.B. McKinlay et al., Sources of Variation in Physician Adherence with Clinical
Guidelines: Results from a Factorial Experiment, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 289, 292 (2007)
(noting that compliance with various evidence-based guidelines among primary care physicians
varied from 6% to 88%); Justin Kung et al., Failure of Clinical Practice Guidelines to Meet
Institute of Medicine Standards: Two More Decades of Little, If Any, Progress, 26 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1628, 1628 (2012) (noting that in general, "clinical practice guidelines have played
an increasingly prominent role in dictating the practice of medicine," but that these guidelines
"demonstrate[] poor compliance with [Institute of Medicine] standards, with little if any
improvement over the past two decades").
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clinical trials, but it seems that practitioners are nonetheless willing to adopt
untested innovations and ignore rigorously proven improvements. This may be
due to ignorance of the most recent datal60 or simply the belief that they know
what's best for their own patients. 161
Whatever happens in practice, though, the research community takes note of
new updates in the field, and the results from one clinical study often serve as the
jumping-off point for another. Research is an inherently iterative process, with
each experiment building on and refining the results of those that came before.' 6 2
2. Law: Subjective Legal "Truths"
The process of implementation plays out differently in law, in part because
of the nature of legal "truths." Medical research purports to describe immutable
biological facts, and practicing physicians may choose to disagree with the
reported results based on other public studies or their own personal experience.
Legal truths, however, are ultimately determined and articulated by judges.163
Practicing attorneys are not free to disregard judicial precedent the way doctors
can shrug off non-binding clinical guidelines.164
For this reason, lawyers are typically cautious about adopting novel products
that were developed in innovative practice. They may be reluctant to pursue legal
strategies that have yet to receive official sanction in the legislature or the courts,
since their clients would face the risk of an unfavorable judicial decision that
could expose them to liability. Even if a novel legal product or theory is
approved in one state or circuit, it may not receive similarly favorable treatment
in other jurisdictions, and thus lawyers may choose to proceed with caution.
A curious caveat to this argument rests on the principle of strength in
numbers: the very fact of widespread adoption could have an effect on a judge's
ruling, since the overall consequences of rejecting a particular practice depend in
160. Avorn, supra note 157 (describing the constant influx of new information and wryly
commenting that "even the most superbly assembled evidence doesn't disseminate itself').
161. See Christel Mottur-Pilson, Physician Explanations for Failing to Comply with "Best
Practices", 4 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRAC. 207, 207 (2001) (noting that "physicians may disagree
about what constitutes 'best practices"').
162. The first step in this iterative process is simply to confirm the results. See Joffe & Miller,
supra note 4, at 34 (noting that reproducibility of results is an essential component of creating truly
generalizable knowledge).
163. Every law student is familiar with Justice Marshall's famous maxim that judges have the
duty to "say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See also ACKERMAN,
supra note 6, at 18 (explaining the Burkean view that the common law consists of the "gradual
accretion of concrete decisions" by judges over time).
164. Cf Sage, supra note 67, at 59 ("[L]awyers perceive authority as derived from man-made
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large part on how prevalent the practice already is.1 65 In general, however, it
seems the burden of testing novel legal products in court falls on the innovators
themselves, with a favorable decision paving the way for broader implementation
and use.' 66
The type of experimentation most commonly associated with cause lawyers
is less tightly linked to the everyday practice of law, and may not involve so
straightforward a question as the validity of a particular corporate structure or
contractual feature. Some cases really do produce an immediate and obvious
effect, particularly when a pervasive law is declared unconstitutional and can no
longer be legally enforced. 167 In some instances, though, society can be as
unresponsive to a purported change in the law as free-spirited physicians often
are to the latest set of clinical guidelines from an expert panel in faraway
Washington, D.C. This raises interesting questions about the difference between
"the law as it is written [and] as it is applied."I 68
In some cases, a statute alleged to be unconstitutional may not even be
routinely enforced, but activist groups seek to have it declared unconstitutional
on principle as a statement about justice, or because its very existence has
insidious side effects.' 69 In other cases, a decision may seem like a decisive legal
victory, but then falls short on actually producing the change articulated in its
aspirational vision. Brown v. Board of Education is one of the most well-known
and publicly praised decisions in recent Supreme Court history, but it is also
often cited as a prime example of an ostensibly forceful judicial decree whose
implementation depended on intense and chaotic action in legislatures,
government offices, and courts across the country.o70 Cases like Brown have led
165. See Kettering, supra note 15, at 1562. Kettering describes the weak doctrinal
underpinnings for the now-common financial practice of securitization, but opines that courts are
unlikely to declare it unlawful because of the "drastic adverse consequences for holders of the vast
quantity of outstanding securitized debt." Id. Thus, he concludes that "the doctrinal shakiness of
securitization is now irrelevant, because the product has grown too big to fail." Id.
166. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 51, at 440. Wachtell Lipton invented the "poison pill" anti-
takeover device, and was the only firm to use it until it was upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court
in a 1985 decision. Id. at 439. "Once the Delaware Supreme Court had put its seal of approval on
the poison pill, however, its diffusion occurred very rapidly," and "within nine months of the
court's decision 263 companies had poison pills in place." Id. The history of the poison pill is
discussed at greater length in Subsection II.C.1, supra.
167. See Hunter, supra note 57, at 1013 (noting that after Roe v. Wade, "not a single state
abortion statute remained constitutional").
168. Etienne, supra note 41, at 1212.
169. See CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 107-08 (discussing the pernicious effects of a law that
"packs a strong cultural message about the group it affects," even when enforcement is rare);
JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 15 (noting that the Connecticut anti-contraception law had "never been
enforced," but "likely had a chilling effect on the provision of birth control information,"
particularly to low-income women).
170. See MELTSNER & SCHRAG, supra note 59, at 77 (noting that "hundreds of lawyers have
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some commentators to claim that litigation is an imperfect tool for social change,
or even that litigation alone can never succeed if it's not part of a broader
movement of political mobilization.171
Of course, the Supreme Court rulings discussed in this Note are notorious
for reasons far beyond their impact on the particular legal question at issue in the
case. The Griswold decision, for instance, achieved a victory by allowing
clinicians to provide contraception to married couples without fear of legal
sanction, but the case has deeper import in the history of American jurisprudence
as the genesis of the modem doctrine of privacy. 172 The law is an ever-flowing
river that may change course at any moment. Griswold's privacy rights and
Brown's equal protection rights have been subject to constant and often
inconsistent reinterpretation.17 3 Just as each new clinical study furthers the quest
to refine our understanding of disease and wellbeing, experimentation in the law
feeds an ongoing process of iterative jurisprudential exploration quite apart from
considerations about the concrete day-to-day impacts of each decision.
IV. REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS: EXPERIMENTATION ACKNOWLEDGED AND
IGNORED
Thus far, this Note has largely focused on outlining broad similarities-
qualified by a few distinctions-in the way the medical and legal professions
approach practice, innovation, and experimentation. Enormous differences exist,
however, when it comes to the way these distinctions are treated under the law.
In Part IV, I briefly trace each profession's history through the twentieth century
to better understand how key events and public pressures produced a formal split
spent twenty years in school desegregation litigation-some of the suits new test cases to interpret
[Brown v. Board of Education] . . ., some of them mere enforcement actions" against "recalcitrant
school boards" or "unreconstructed federal district judges"); Hunter, supra note 57, at 1013 (noting
the importance of "legislative enactment and litigation enforcement" in Brown's wake).
171. See ROSENBERG, supra note 58, at 421 ("[T]here is no substitute for political action ....
[N]ot as a fallback position, not as a complement to a legal strategy, but as the strategy itself.");
Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
201, 215 (1999) (arguing that "[o]f all the tools for change, political action holds the most
transformative potential," while litigation has only "a marginal impact"). But see Hunter, supra
note 57 (arguing that litigation complements political mobilization by providing a vocabulary of
rights, a motivational focal point, and salience in the media).
172. JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 223 ("The constitutional right of privacy established in
Griswold... was extended... to cover such important dimensions of human existence as
marriage, procreation, family relationships, child rearing, and education."); see, e.g., In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 40 (1976) (relying on the privacy analysis outlined in Griswold to establish the right for
patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
173. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 3-4 (1996) (analyzing the history of school
desegregation and affirmative action policies and noting a "profound shift ofjudicial philosophy"
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between medical practice and clinical research, and why no such division exists
within the legal profession.
A. History ofProfessional Regulation
1. Medical Dualism: A Response to Past Abuses
The relationship between science and medicine changed dramatically around
the turn of the twentieth century. Rapid advances in the natural sciences
prompted increasing scientific rigor in medical training and clinical practice,174
which in turn generated the hybrid role of the "clinical scientist, versed in the
bedside practice of medicine and capable of applying the knowledge and
techniques of the basic sciences to the study of human disease."' 75 At this time, it
was common for physicians to experiment on their patients, often without their
knowledge.176
Revelations of the cruel experiments performed on prisoners in the Nazi
concentration camps during World War II shocked the global conscience and
inspired the Nuremberg Code, the first international agreement on the ethics of
research on human subjects.177 The Code did not have the force of law, 7 8 but
rather urged physicians to adhere to the ethical research principles as a matter of
self-enforced professional responsibility. 7 9 The Code called for informed
consent and voluntary participation from subjects,' 0 but in the ensuing years,
some American researchers quietly resumed the practice of carrying out
potentially harmful experiments on their patients without their knowledge.' 8 '
In 1966, Harvard researcher Henry Beecher published an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine describing twenty-two recent studies that put
174. See HARVEY,supra note 61, at404-05.
175. Id. at 183. By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a generally recognized
distinction between the fields of basic scientific research and medical practice. Id. at 128. Clinical
researchers existed as a blended role, which "served to bridge the gap" between these professional
identities. Id. at 183.
176. See generally SUSAN E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN
AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1997) (describing several experiments conducted
clandestinely by medical professionals and by the government in the years 1890 to 1940); see also
Krupat et al., supra note 35, at 50 (describing medical paternalism more generally).
177. See Jonathan R. Markman & Maurie Markman, Running an Ethical Trial 60 Years After
the Nuremberg Code, 8 LANCET ONCOLOGY 1139-40; see generally Office Human Research Prots.
The Nuremberg Code, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html (last updated Nov. 7,
2005).
178. Markman & Markman, supra note 177, at 1140.
179. See Office Human Research Prots., supra note 177 (phrasing the ethical rules as
normative professional guidelines rather than hard rules).
180. Id. ("The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.").
181. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEJM 1354, 1354 (1966);
Markman & Markman, supra note 177, at 1141-43.
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human lives at risk.182 These studies were carried out at prestigious institutions
and were well known in the medical community, but the patients involved were
often not aware that they had been subjects in a medical experiment.1' A few
years later, news broke of the Tuskegee syphilis study, a thirty-year, government-
funded initiative in which clinicians falsely promised treatment to African
American men suffering from venereal disease and instead simply recorded the
progression of their illness.184
In response to these well-publicized abuses, the federal government
conducted hearings, passed legislation, and ultimately established firm ethical
and legal requirements for research on human subjects.s 5  The ethical
underpinnings of this regulatory framework were laid out in the Belmont Report,
which explained the imperative to seek voluntary informed consent from research
subjects, to refrain from studies in which the risk to human subjects outweighs
the potential benefits of the research, and to avoid recruiting subjects from
populations that are vulnerable to coercion or abuse.'86 These requirements are
codified in the Department of Health and Human Services' "Common Rule,", 87
along with a requirement that all proposed research on human subjects be
reviewed by an Internal Review Board (IRB) to ensure adequate protections.' 88
Regular medical practice is not affected by these regulations; they only apply to
clinical research, defined as any "systematic investigation" designed to
"contribute to generalizable knowledge."' 89 Whereas the Nuremberg Code
182. Beecher, supra note 181. For example, Beecher describes two studies where patients
were injected with live cancer cells to test the human immune response. Id. at 1358-59.
183. Id. at 1354.
184. See About the USPHS Syphilis Study, TUSKEGEE UNIv., http://www.tuskegee.edu/about
_us/centers of excellence/bioethicscenter/aboutthe-usphs-syphil is.study.aspx (last visited June
16, 2013); see also Robert M. White, Unraveling the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis, 160
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 585, 595 (2000) (noting that scientific publications describing the
Tuskegee study "did not disturb the editors, peer reviewers, and readership," but that the study
generated national controversy after "a newspaper article exposed it").
185. See Tom L. Beauchamp & Yashar Sangai, The Historical Foundations of the Research-
Practice Distinction in Bioethics, 33 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 45, 47-48 (2012).
186. Belmont Report, supra note 8. These ethical "applications" are derived from the three
fundamental principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.
187. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2014). See generally Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects ("Common Rule'), supra note 10.
188. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. The Common Rule only applies to federally funded research, but the
FDA has imposed largely identical requirements on research submitted as part of applications for
approval of FDA-regulated products. See 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2014). Large academic medical
institutions typically require IRB approval for all studies involving human subjects. See, e.g.,
Office of the Vice President for Research, Institutional Review Board: Does My Research Need
IRB Review?, U. MINN. (last updated Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.research.umn.edu/irb/research.html
("The university's IRB has assured federal regulatory agencies that the institution will review and
approve all research that meet the federal definition of human subjects research.").




Polaris: Principles over Principals? How Innovation Affects the Agency Rel
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
PRINCIPLES OVER PRINCIPALS
envisioned research ethics as a component of individual professional
responsibility, the Common Rule represents an external intrusion into the
prevailing model of self-regulation.19 0
2. Legal Monism: One Code of Ethics for Many Categories of Conduct
Lawyers have been fiercely committed to the idea of self-regulation since
state bar associations were first formed around the turn of the twentieth
century.191 The profession's self-defined role has been the pursuit of justice
through adversarial client-centered advocacy.19 2 The main professional codes of
conduct underwent significant changes in 1969 and 1983, 93 transitioning from a
set of aspirational guidelines for ethical behavior and civic virtue to a set of
baseline requirements for minimally acceptable conduct.194 Despite the increased
specificity of the modern rules, however, they failed to acknowledge the
innovation and experimentation that were already occurring among certain
established branches of the profession.195
The "corporate revolution" that followed World War I institutionalized the
primacy of the publicly traded corporation, prompting increased regulation from
purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or supported under a program which is
considered research for other purposes." Id. The definition of "generalizable knowledge" is largely
stated in terms of the intentions of the researchers, see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text,
which can create uncertainty where an activity designed for quality improvement is construed by
HHS enforcers as research, see infra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
190. Self-regulated professions generally seek to preserve their autonomy, but "self-
governance is understood to be rooted in a delegation of the legislature's power to regulate ....
The state grants the authority to self-regulate-and can take it away." Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal
Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal
Markets, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1689, 1696 (2008).
191. Marvelle C. Webber, Origin and Uses of Bar Associations, 7 A.B.A. J. 297, 300 (1921)
(arguing that state bar associations should be created because "the bar itself should have broad
powers of discipline and control over [admissions]"); see also Robert J. Kutak, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Why Do We Need Them?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 311, 315 (1983) ("There can be
no question but that our profession-perhaps more so than any other-is seriously committed to
self-regulation."). "Congress has largely remained out of the field of lawyer regulation," Hadfield,
supra note 190, at 1699, with state courts and bar associations playing a critical role in devising and
enforcing the rules, see id at 1698.
192. See Johnston & Lufrano, supra note 2, at 147.
193. See generally Carl Horn, Ill, Evolution of Lawyer Self-Regulation: 1908 to 2008 in a
Nutshell, I CHARLOTTE L. REv. 3 (2008); John M. Tyson, Short History of the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility: 1908-2008, 1 CHARLOTTE L. REV.9 (2008).
194. See Tyson, supra note 193, at 10.
195. However, the profession's sense of civic duty arguably does encompass serving the
public interest as lawyer-statesmen. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 49; Karen L.
Loewy, Lawyering for Social Change, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1896, 1872-74 (2000).
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the government.196 The ensuing specialization among practicing attorneys
produced the modem stratified model in which large, elite firms cater to large,
corporate clients.19 7 Cause lawyering, meanwhile, is commonly thought to have
originated with the civil rights movement in the 1960s.' 98 There was a backlash
against this new form of advocacy from within the legal profession and the
public at large,' 99 but the organized profession eventually made a kind of uneasy
peace with cause lawyering.200 Indeed, the same politicized identity and strategic
litigation tactics have been taken up by liberal and conservative attorneys on a
variety of issues, meaning that cause lawyering is now firmly entrenched within
the profession and widely represented across the political spectrum.201
B. Public Perception and Public Regulation
1. Public Trust
A comparison with the physician-researcher split in bioethics suggests some
possibilities that may underlie the legal profession's continued failure to
acknowledge its own experimental arm in the codes of professional conduct.
Doctors have long been highly trusted as a profession. 20 2 Trust in medical
researchers has not been as carefully studied, but it seems that researchers today
benefit from general public trust in universities and health care institutions.20 3
Goodwill toward medical researchers is distinct from the public's positive
feelings about doctors,20 4 however, and is more easily lost in the event of
suspicious conduct.205
196. See Hadfield, supra note 190, at 1703-04.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 104-108.
198. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 4.
199. See Thomas M. Hilbink, "The Kids Are Alright:" Cause Lawyering on Television in
1960s America, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS 203, 204 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2008) ("Many Americans were deeply anxious about this emerging subculture
within the generally tradition-bound and well-established legal profession.").
200. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 40.
201. See id. at 3.
202. See Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It
Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 624 (2001); Leo J. Shapiro & Assocs.,
Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, ABA 6 (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter
Public Perceptions of Lawyers], http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate
/publicperceptionsl.pdf (noting that doctors ranked highest out of ten professions on measures of
public confidence).
203. See Michael McDonald et al., Trust in Health Research Relationships: Accounts of
Human Subjects, 3 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 35, 40 (2008); Sugarman et al., supra note
21, at 5.
204. See Mark A. Hall et al., Measuring Trust in Medical Researchers, 44 MED. CARE 1048,
1048 (2006).
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Even today, the specter of past abuses hangs over experimentation on human
subjects. Any article on research ethics typically makes at least a passing
reference to this tragic history, and any publicized incident of research subjects
206coming to harm generates renewed calls for stricter regulations2. The memory
of past transgressions on the part of clinical researchers also lingers in the public
consciousness. For example, individuals who know about the Tuskegee study
tend to have less trust in clinical researchers overall and are less likely to consent
to participation in research studies. 207
The history of experimentation in law 2 08 is, in some ways, the inverse of this
cautionary tale. Unlike doctors, lawyers have traditionally been viewed with
suspicion and distrust, tolerated as a necessary evil rather than admired as a noble
calling. 209 Indeed, the three main seismic shifts in professional self-regulation
were motivated in part by a desire among lawyers to improve the public
perception of their profession. 2 10 Cause lawyers, on the other hand, are often held
in higher regard than the general profession for the very reason that makes them
an anomaly under the Model Rules: rather than acting as a "hired gun" and
selling their skills to the highest bidder, they dedicate themselves to serving their
conception of the public interest.211
be easily broken.").
206. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, First-in-Human Trial Participants: Not a Vulnerable
Population, but Vulnerable Nonetheless, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 41 (2009) (noting that after a
trial in which several subjects experienced severe adverse drug reactions, "some experts called for
systemic changes to increase ... trial safety").
207. Vickie L. Shavers et al., Knowledge of the Tuskegee Study and Its Impact on the
Willingness to Participate in Medical Research Studies, 92 J. NAT'L MED. Ass'N 563 (2000). It has
also been consistently documented that African Americans are more likely than other groups to
view medical research as risky and to decline participation. See, e.g., Sugarman et al., supra note
21, at 5 (finding this distrust "not surprising[]," given that the African American community "was
the subject of perhaps the most egregious episode of abuse of human subjects in American
history").
208. This section focuses on cause lawyers, since they represent the most radical departure
from traditional legal ethics by shifting the focus from the individual client to the broader social
mission.
209. See Public Perceptions of Lawyers, supra note 202, at 6 ("[T]he legal profession is
among the least reputed institutions in American society.").
210. See Tyson, supra note 193, at 18 ("[A]mendments to the Canons, Model Code, and
Model Rules have addressed the changes in the practice of law and expectations of society.");
Lewis F. Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 51 A.B.A. J.
821, 822 (1965) (explaining the motivations for updating the professional rules of conduct,
including poor public opinion of the profession); see also Webber, supra note 191, at 300 (noting
that state bar associations were created because the legal profession did not hold the "confidence
and esteem of the public" and "no greater improvement in this situation can be had without
bringing the entire bar into an organization" that "shall be responsible for their professional
conduct").
211. See Austin Sarat & Stewart Scheingold, Bringing Cultural Analysis to the Study of Cause
Lawyers: An Introduction, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, supra note 199, at 1, 2;
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As it turns out, some members of the public reject the traditional premise of
lawyers as neutral advocates who preserve the innate justice of the adversarial
system. According to a study commissioned by the ABA, the legal profession has
"a reputation for winning at all costs, and for being driven by profit and self-
interest, rather than client interest." 2 12 It seems that the public suspects all
lawyers of harboring motivations extraneous to their clients' needs, and many
would prefer that those motivations stem from a desire to serve the public interest
rather than from self-interest.
2. Public Awareness
Often, however, the media and the public simply fail to distinguish between
traditional and cause lawyers.2 13 Major test cases on important issues typically
receive prospective media attention leading up to the oral arguments or the
decision, but the coverage tends to focus on the clients rather than the attorneys.
The lawyers are often referenced only as "a form of citation to the law"; 2 14 they
are portrayed as legal experts helping a brave client seek justice rather than as
movers and shakers in a coordinated ideological movement that may well have
planned the case from the ground up. 2 15
The fact that there are media representations of these cases at all raises
another salient point of difference with the medical context, since clinical
research is typically conducted out of the public eye in hospitals and laboratories.
The public may learn of major discoveries in news coverage of recent findings,
but the focus only shifts to the individual researchers when the media profiles a
star of the field,216 or when something goes wrong and a research subject is
Public Perceptions of Lawyers, supra note 202, at 11 (noting that civil rights lawyers enjoy a more
positive public perception than the profession at large because they are "said to be working in the
public interest").
212. Public Perceptions of Lawyers, supra note 202, at 7. This attitude likely applies to the
corporate lawyers we have been discussing, whose work on behalf of large corporations fails to
generate the feel-good response of civil rights attorneys.
213. See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 211, at 7 (noting that "representations of cause
lawyers in popular culture are often hard to distinguish from representations of mainstream
lawyers").
214. Laura J. Hatcher, Of Windmills and Wetlands: The Press and the Romance of Property
Rights, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, supra note 199, at 188, 188.
215. For discussions of how this plays out in a variety of films and news media reports, see id.
(discussing media coverage of conservative property rights lawyers); Michael McCann & William
Haltom, Nothing to Believe In: Contemporary Films About Public Interest Litigation, in THE
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, supra note 199, at 230 (discussing the films Erin Brokovich
and North Country); Stuart A. Scheingold, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Cause Lawyering,
Popular Culture, and A Civil Action, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, supra note 199,
at 331 (discussing the book and film versions of A Civil Action).
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harmed.217 These latter instances of opprobrious retroactive awareness may feed
public feelings of blame or betrayal for studies that are perceived as unethical by
design.218
Most clinical research and most litigation proceed without major mishap or
public awareness. When harm does occur, however, the public perceives the
injury differently in the medical and legal contexts. Everyone can agree that a
healthy research subject who suffered severe consequences during an experiment
suffered a direct harm.2 19 The stakes may be just as high for clients in appellate
cases, since criminal defendants may be appealing sentences of life imprisonment
or execution. Even in civil cases, clients with strong beliefs about racial equality
or religious liberty may accord these values equal weight with physical health.
Nonetheless, any ruling on equal protection or abortion inevitably leaves some
members of the public feeling validated and others feeling oppressed.220
Moreover, the public may blame the "activist judges" who made the decision
rather than the cause lawyers who argued in favor of it.22 1
The emerging picture of cause lawyers is that of a generally favored subset
within a generally disfavored profession. In this light, it seems hardly surprising
that they have not been the target of regulatory constraints. The legal profession
may tacitly avoid drawing distinctions because practitioners benefit from being
associated with a publicly admired form of lawyering.222 The potential harms to
clients or society are on par with those of abusive clinical research, but the
government has had no need to step in because there has been no public outcry
for tighter restrictions on a class of lawyers that generally receives praise, when
/profiles-in-science-series.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2013) ("A series of articles and videos about
leaders in science.").
217. See, e.g., Sabrina Taverise, Study of Babies Did Not Disclose Risks, U.S. Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2013 (listing the individual researchers associated with a study under review by the
federal Office of Human Research Protections).
218. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 206, at 42 (discussing such a response following the death
of Jesse Gelsinger in a gene transfer study).
219. However, confusion over research methods can even produce public opprobrium for
studies that likely didn't increase the risk of harm at all. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Drazen et al.,
Informed Consent and SUPPORT, 368 NEJM 1929 (2013) (arguing that a recent study in which
several preterm infants suffered death or blindness was consistent with known research at the time
it was initiated, and was thus wrongly targeted for enforcement action by the Office for Human
Research Protection (OHRP)); see also Tavernise, supra note 217 (describing the OHRP
enforcement action in the New York Times).
220. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (2009) (noting that after a
controversial Supreme Court decision, "those who disagree with the justices lash out at the Court
and the power of judicial review. Those who agree with the justices jump to their defense, waving
the Constitution.")
221. See id. at 9 (noting that often in the court of public opinion, "a fight over the Constitution
becomes one about the judges").
222. SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 127.
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the public notices it at all. 223
C. Protecting Cause Lawyers from Regulation
An intriguing wrinkle to this story is that the Supreme Court has, in fact,
singled out cause lawyers as a distinct group, but only in order to protect them
from regulation. Most notably, the Court held in 1978 that cause lawyers are
exempted from state prohibitions on soliciting clients.224 Justice Powell's opinion
in In re Primus sums up the ethos of cause lawyering by explaining that
organizations like the ACLU and the NAACP pursue litigation not as "a
technique of resolving private differences," but as "a form of political expression
and political association."2 25 The activities of lawyers like ACLU attorney Edna
Primus were thus held to be protected under the First Amendment, including
their practice of identifying and contacting potential clients.22 6 By way of
contrast, Justice Powell referenced another decision handed down the same day
affirming each state's right to proscribe "solicitation by lawyers who seek to
communicate purely commercial offers of legal assistance to lay persons."227
Though Justice Rehnquist dissented in the outcome, nowhere in his opinion
does he reject the majority's "tale of two lawyers,"228 which portrayed cause
lawyers as distinct from private firms that solicit clients for pecuniary gain.
Indeed, no member of the Court disputed the existence of cause lawyers as a
subclass of attorneys qualitatively distinct from traditional lawyers; the sole point
of disagreement was on the question of whether legislatures and courts can
reliably distinguish between the two, or even have the constitutional authority to
do so. 229
In re Primus concerned a private organization, but the courts have also
stepped in to prevent the government from unduly interfering in legal programs
funded by public dollars. Peter Joy describes a number of statutory restrictions on
legal services programs and legal aid clinics at public universities that were
struck down under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. 230 Aside
223. There have been cries for public reform of the bar in general following events like
Watergate or the Enron collapse, but "the history of the ABA's professional regulation is to resist
these calls for reform . . . and to maintain the regime of self-regulation." Gerard J. Clark, Monopoly
Power in Defense of the Status Quo: A Critique of the ABA's Role in the Regulation of the
American Legal Profession, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1009, 1027 (2012).
224. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
225. Id. at 428.
226. This is a critical part of cause lawyers' work, since they often work very hard to find just
the right client for each case. See supra note 53.
227. Id. at 422 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978)).
228. Id. at 440-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
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from certain situations where the courts have found a right to appointed
counsel,23' the government has discretion in choosing whether to fund a legal aid
program at all. Once funded, however, the judicial consensus seems to be that the
government may not place restrictions on the types of clients those lawyers can
represent or the types of arguments they are allowed to make.232 The ABA has
also come out in support of independence for legal services programs and legal
aid clinics in law schools, 23 3 evincing the high-level professional approval of
public interest lawyers working to represent the underrepresented with both
direct services and broader, cause-based initiatives.
The courts are much better than the general public at recognizing and
describing cause lawyers, and seem willing to defend their work against certain
kinds of regulatory encroachment. This judicial protection is one facet of the
generally favorable attitude toward cause lawyers explored in the foregoing
sections, a halo of goodwill that may help to explain why cause lawyers are not
subject to the kind of strict legal oversight that governs clinical research. Cause
lawyers are not the only ones innovating within the law, as discussed in Part II,
but attorneys in white shoe firms who represent corporate clients fit with the
public's conception of what lawyering normally looks like. Because their
innovation and experimentation is likely to be perceived as general legal practice,
corporate lawyers are unlikely to be singled out for specific regulation, even if
their experimentation is actually quite different from the work of other lawyers.
While the innovative cause lawyers discussed in this section were protected from
regulation because they stood out from the profession for their mission-driven
work, innovative corporate lawyers may be similarly protected due to their
invisibility within the profession.
When Is There a Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1087 (2011). A law prohibiting legal aid
lawyers from bringing constitutional challenges on behalf of indigent clients was struck down in
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 31 U.S. 533 (2001). See Joy, supra, at 1098-1100. When the
University of Mississippi disciplined clinical professors for helping law students to participate in a
desegregation case, the Fifth Circuit found it to be unlawful discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause and a violation of due process. See Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499 (5th
Cir. 1969); Joy, supra, at I 100-0 1.
231. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal
defendants have a right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment); Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (holding that
individuals in immigration detention who have serious mental disorders "are entitled to the
reasonable accommodation of appointment of a Qualified Representative to assist them in their
removal and detention proceedings under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act").
232. Notably, these decisions only pertain to the faculty, who are licensed practitioners; courts
are more permissive with regard to restrictions on the students themselves. See Joy, supra note 230,
at 1105.
233. See Joy, supra note 230, at 1107 (describing various ABA statements and policies).
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V. GRAVITATING TOWARD THE CENTER: IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
Though medicine and law now exist under very different regulatory
frameworks, both professions show tendencies of gravitating toward the center of
the spectrum between practice and experimentation. Practitioners hope to give
their patients and clients the benefits of innovation, while professionals engaged
in experimentation are often reluctant to relinquish a principal-centered outlook.
Part V describes these shared inclinations and explores the implications for each
profession's rules of conduct, paying special attention to the specific reforms that
are currently being considered in each field.
A. Medicine and Clinical Research
1. A Bright Line with Gray Areas
Because of the stark regulatory bifurcation between medical practice and
clinical research, any federally funded activity deemed to "contribute to
generalizable knowledge" under the Common Rule triggers a swathe of
substantive and procedural requirements. 234 The determination is thus an
important one, but is not always easy to make because of the hazy line between
research and innovative practice.235
"Innovative therapies need not be classified as research ... so long as they
are designed solely to benefit the patient" and are not intended to create
generalizable knowledge. 236 This criterion is nominally dispositive, but the
distinction is highly subjective, and may change over time as a given treatment is
modified and refined. Such delicate parsing can also seem quibbling and
misguided in the context of clinical care that generates knowledge without
compromising patient interests. A gray area that has attracted attention lately is
quality improvement initiatives that involve routine data collection on patient
outcomes. 237 These activities may well aim to produce generalizable knowledge
useful for improving processes of care, but they have no impact on individual
234. See supra text accompanying notes 187-190.
235. See PLoS Med. Editors, How Can We Draw the Line Between Clinical Care and Medical
Research?, 4 PLoS MED. 1707, 1707 (2007).
236. David B. Resnik, The Clinical Investigator-Subject Relationship: A Contextual
Approach, 4 PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. 16 (2009). The AMA's Code of Medical Ethics does
not explicitly address innovation, but innovative practice seems consistent with the imperative to
"use sound medical judgment, holding the best interests of the patient as paramount." CODE OF
MED. ETHICS Op. 10.015 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2001).
237. See Brody & Miller, supra note 54, at 341 (noting that it may be "difficult to distinguish
between some of the more innovative forms of quality monitoring and improvement and formal
research trials"); Kupersmith, supra note 9 ("[T]he more rigorous the approach to quality
assessment (and therefore greater likelihood of data validity), the more burdens that apply, with the
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patients' care, and would be extremely burdensome if subjected to requirements
like informed consent due to the large number of patients involved.238
Meanwhile, there is an ongoing debate in the research community about
whether the ethics of clinical research are meant to replace traditional medical
ethics or simply to supplement them. The "difference thesis" holds that medical
practice is about treating patients while clinical research is about seeking
generalized knowledge, which may involve compromising the care of individual
patients to ensure accurate results. 23 9 As long as the protocol has been reviewed
for an appropriate balance of risks and benefits and patients have provided
informed consent, such a study would be deemed ethical. Some researchers
instead support a "therapeutic orientation" for clinical research. 24 0 They maintain
that each participant in a research study should be seen as both a subject and a
patient, and adherence to a study protocol should not take precedence over
providing the best treatment for each individual's medical needs. 24 1 The main
guiding documents in research ethics do not resolve this ambiguity: the text of
the Belmont Report suggests that research is distinct from care,2 4 2 but the
Institute of Medicine identifies both research integrity and patient safety as
"primary interests" that should not be compromised, with no indication of what
to do if the two conflict. 2 43
238. For a notorious recent example, see Mary Ann Baily, Quality Improvement Methods in
Health Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC 147, 148 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).
Researchers at Johns Hopkins University Hospital reduced the incidence of catheter-related
bloodstream infections by 66% after analyzing routinely collected patient data following the
implementation of a safety checklist. When the researchers published their findings in 2006,
however, the federal Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP) determined that the activity
constituted research and should have been subjected to the usual Common Rule protections. After
an outcry from the medical community, OHRP backed down and allowed the Hopkins project to
proceed.
239. See Brody & Miller, supra note 54, at 332; Joffe & Miller, supra note 4, at 39; Rosamond
Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICs 7, 20 (2005).
240. See James A. Anderson, Contextualizing Clinical Research: The Epistemological Role of
Clinical Equipoise, 30 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 269, 284 (2009); Robert J. Wells, Letter to
the Editor, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6, 7 (2008).
241. This view relies in part on the critique that the difference thesis does a poor job of
explaining where ethical research ends and exploitation begins. Given the history of the field, some
argue that it is better to risk undermining the research protocol than to risk harming human lives.
See Resnik, supra note 236 (critiquing the view that the difference thesis is permissible so long as
researchers do not exploit their subjects); Wells, supra note 240, at 6.
242. See supra text accompanying notes I 1-14. See generally Beauchamp & Sangai, supra
note 185 (explaining the history of the Belmont Report's ethical differentiation of research and
practice).
243. See COMM. ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MED. RESEARCH, EDUC. & PRACTICE, CONFLICT
OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 6 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field
eds., 2009). For an overview of this report, see Robert Steinbrook, Controlling Conflict of
Interest-Proposals from the Institute of Medicine, 360 NEJM 2160 (2009).
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This debate bleeds over into other areas of research ethics, including
discussions about the therapeutic misconception 24 4 and the value of clinical
equipoise. 2 4 5 The continuing dialogue on these and other issues demonstrates that
ambiguity exists both in differentiating practice from experimentation and also in
defining the precise ethical requirements on the latter side. Many clinical
researchers are loath to abjure the clinician's mantra to look out for the needs of
patients, which keeps the ethics of research tethered to the ethics of practice,
despite the existence of an alternate ethical and regulatory framework.
2. Implications for Reform: Amending the Common Rule
In 2011, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued
an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) with several proposed
modifications to the Common Rule.246 Among other changes, the ANPRM aims
to replace the all-or-nothing model of human subjects protection with a system in
which the level of protection is scaled to match the level of risk. For example,
certain types of low-risk studies would be eligible for an "expedited review"
process with no annual follow-ups, and others would be exempt from many
regulations entirely. As of the time of writing, the public comment period has
closed and HHS has yet to announce further action.
Clinical research commentators have proposed or endorsed similar changes
247over the years, and the foregoing discussion of physician and researcher
attitudes lends further support to this proposal. In a way, the ANPRM shifts the
regulatory model to approximate what many physicians were already doing. On
one hand, any deviation from standard clinical practice could theoretically be
considered "experimentation" in that the physician is testing a hypothesis about
an uncertain outcome, thereby exposing the patient to risk in the pursuit of
244. Some research subjects fail to understand that a study's primary purpose is to produce
knowledge, not to provide personal benefit to them. See Gail E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials
and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS MED. 1735 (2007).
Academics concerned about valid informed consent worry that the therapeutic orientation
contributes to the therapeutic misconception. See Brody & Miller, supra note 54, at 330; Henderson
et al., supra, at 1736.
245. "According to clinical equipoise, it would be wrong to randomize subjects to two arms of
a clinical trial, unless the medical community genuinely was uncertain as to which of the two
treatments was superior." Brody & Miller, supra note 54, at 330 (noting that equipoise is one
corollary of the therapeutic orientation); see also Joffe & Miller, supra note 4, at 39-40 (arguing
that "[t]he therapeutic orientation in the guise of the principle of clinical equipoise categorically
rules out the use of placebo controls when proven effective treatments exist," which "promotes use
of methodologically inferior study designs") (internal footnote omitted).
246. See ANPRM for Revision to Common Rule, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp
/humansubjects/anprm201 lpage.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
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generalizable knowledge about whether the care deviation will work.248
Physicians do not design and register a formal clinical trial for each instance of
such behavior, however, since this clinical variation is essential for tailoring
interventions to each patient's needs and developing novel techniques through
innovative practice.249 Conversely, the debate over the difference thesis
illustrates that clinical researchers are wary of research that poses a high risk to
patients, even when such risk would likely be permissible under the risk-benefit
balance of the Common Rule. A sliding scale of risk-adjusted protections
attempts to capture and address the tension between the innovative and
therapeutic goals of medicine and research.
B. Innovation and Experimentation in Law
1. Defining the Client's Goals
Unlike medicine, the law affords a single set of professional ethics for
activity all along the practice-experimentation spectrum. The ABA Model Rules
direct attorneys to "take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor," 250 which roots any creative developments
within a client-centric practice orientation.
The word "lawful" raises interesting questions for innovation, since novel
developments introduced in practice may not definitively be seen as legal by the
profession at large until they are sanctioned by a judge or codified in a statute.2 51
It may well be sufficient for the innovating lawyer to believe that the new
2125
development is lawful based on a competent legal assessment,22 similar to the
Code of Medical Ethics' insistence on a good-faith effort at "sound medical
judgment." 25 3 Creativity and innovation can help advance the needs of individual
clients, but the Model Rules' focus on "vindicat[ing] a client's cause or
248. See Brody & Miller, supra note 54, at 342-43.
249. See supra note 67.
250. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.3 cmt. para. 1.
251. See Subsection lIl.B.2, supra (discussing the processes by which novel legal products
and theories disseminate within the profession).
252. A lawyer's competence to handle an issue depends on factors like the "relative
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's
training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give
the matter." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.1 cmt. para. 1. This may explain why innovative
practice is typically limited to a small group of high-powered private firms, since they may be
uniquely positioned to satisfy these criteria for highly complex transactions and corporate
structures. See supra text accompanying notes 104-112.
253. See supra note 236; see also MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d) (noting that a lawyer may "counsel
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endeavor" 254 can produce ethical quandaries in the legal contexts we have been
discussing. As it turns out, corporate attorneys and cause lawyers nevertheless
find ways to innovate and experiment within the bounds of ill-fitting professional
ethics by carefully selecting their clients and carefully defining their clients'
goals.
Corporate attorneys face a conceptual challenge. As Milton C. Regan
explains, "[t]he lawyer who represents a corporation represents an abstraction:
her client is the corporate entity rather than any of the individuals who act on its
behalf."2 55 The challenge of serving a legal construct may explain why corporate
lawyers often act in an advisory capacity, helping to guide the direction of the
corporation in addition to meeting its basic legal needs.256 To a certain extent,
corporate lawyers collapse the distinction between the ends and means of
representation: 25 7 they serve the interests of their client, but may also play an
active role in determining what those interests are. Innovative lawyers who
develop new legal products and approaches may suggest goals for the
corporation that are only possible by virtue of the attorneys' expertise and
creativity. If all goes well, the corporation gains a competitive edge and the law
firm bolsters its reputation for cutting-edge work.
Cause lawyers face a similar conceptual challenge, since they advocate on
258behalf of a social movement that may have divisive constituent factions. In
order to get to the courtroom, however, they must attach the cause to a particular
client capable of meeting the requirements of standing.2 59 Using individual cases
as vehicles for broader legal reform seems to defy the Model Rules' edict for
zealous "advocacy upon the client's behalf,"2 60 which is why cause lawyers are
,,261perceived by some as "a deviant strain within the legal profession.
254. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.3 cmt. para. 1.
255. Regan, supra note 105, at 199.
256. See Donald K. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L. J. 375, 377 (1997) (noting that
business law "is probably the setting in which elite lawyers are most widely employed in an
advisory capacity"); Powell, supra note 51, at 432.
257. See supra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text (describing the traditional division of
authority as one where the client determines the goals of representation and the lawyer decides the
means).
258. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Eastman, supra note 132, at 801
("Sometimes I wondered who my client was-the person with the name, the class she represented,
or the issue behind her. . . .").
259. See supra note 53. Unlike social movements, corporations are legal entities that are
capable of suing and being sued as if they were people. See, e.g., Louisville, Cincinnati, and
Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) (superseded on other grounds by
statute as noted in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)).
260. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.3 cmt. para. 1.
261. Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 211, at 2. These authors cite cause lawyers' unabashed
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What happens, for example, when the lawyer has the opportunity to settle a
case, or to win in court on a technicality? Both these options could provide swift
and definitive resolution for the client, but would fail to establish the precedent
the lawyer was hoping for.2 62 Some clients may be reluctant to risk victory on
their personal dispute, or to endure the publicity associated with being the face of
the case. Under the Model Rules, the lawyer could discuss the goals of litigation
and attempt to persuade the client to stay the course,263 but would ultimately have
to accede to the client's demands.264
To avoid this problem, experienced cause lawyers typically screen potential
clients to make sure they are willing to prioritize the movement's goals over any
265
personal concerns. There would seem to be no conflict under the Model Rules
if the client is as enthusiastic about social reform as the lawyers themselves.
Clients are tasked with determining the goals of representation, which could
reasonably involve decisions like declining settlement offers and pushing for a
trial. In such a scenario, the whole business of cause lawyering can be recast as
client-centered advocacy on behalf of a social-minded client.266 These cause
representation of a client . .. does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic,
social or moral views or activities," MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.2(b), but cause lawyers are
"eager to take sides in social conflict and to identify themselves with the sides they take,"
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 9. Thus, they "destabiliz[e] the dominant
understanding of lawyering as properly wedded to moral neutrality." Sarat & Scheingold, supra
note 211, at 2.
262. MELTSNER & SCHRAG, supra note 59, at 2; see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978)
(noting that the NAACP represents individual clients in segregation cases but rejects "any relief
short of full integration"). But see MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decision whether to settle a matter."). For an example where settling a dispute concerning
a specific agency decision vitiated standing for the purposes of challenging the underlying rule, see
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
263. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.2 cmt. para. 2 (noting that in the event of a
disagreement, "the lawyer should ... consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable
resolution.").
264. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.2 cmt. para. I (noting that the client has "the ultimate
authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation"). Negotiations over the
goals of representation also create the potential for sophisticated cause lawyers to manipulate less
educated clients. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 317 (1988);
Loewy, supra note 195, at 1884-85.
265. See MELTSNER & SCHRAG, supra note 59, at 82 (noting that many cause lawyers will
"accept only clients who are willing to be test case litigants" and all that that entails); see also
CARPENTER, supra note 96, at 131-34 (explaining how two men arrested for sodomy were hesitant
about a protracted public legal campaign, but were ultimately persuaded to act as test case litigants
after hearing about the history of the LGBT rights movement).
266. Some have argued that cause lawyering is only truly ethical when it incorporates the
principles of informed consent, as in clinical research. See Loewy, supra note 195, at 1892; The
Plaintiffas Person, supra note 132, at 1512. Warning potential clients about the implications of
participating in cause-oriented litigation is both commendable and prudent, but a rigorous informed
consent requirement may fail to assist vulnerable clients any more than cause lawyers' consciences
already do. This has to do with the specific nature of legal practice, see Etienne, supra note 41, at
345
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lawyers have broad goals of generalized impact, which means they are well out
of the zone of routine practice. Nonetheless, they manage to adhere to the letter
of the Model Rules and the spirit of client-centered zealous advocacy, despite the
fact that the true nature of their motivations falls outside the scope of practice
envisioned in those rules.
2. Implications for Reform: Proceed with Caution
The initial inquiry of this Note focused on similarities in the actual processes
of innovation in experimentation in medicine and law. Despite the many shared
features, the foregoing discussion suggests that imposing medicine's dualistic
regulatory model in the legal context would be inappropriate or at least
unnecessary. The Model Rules do not explicitly acknowledge experimentation,
but the two innovative strains of lawyers discussed here have nonetheless settled
into a comfortable quasi-compliance. The safeguards of conscience and client
satisfaction prevent attorneys from trampling clients' desires in a quest for legal
change.
Thus, an awareness of legal experimentation may not in and of itself suggest
new directions for regulatory reform, but it can certainly play a role in informing
the existing debate over proposed changes to the Model Rules. The intensifying
global competition for legal services 2 6 7 has generated growing interest in novel
268approaches to payment, employee compensation, and practice management.
Some argue that these structural adjustments are inhibited by regulatory
restrictions, such as prohibitions on multi-jurisdictional or multi-disciplinary
practice269 or the rules on conflicts of interest. 2 70 A full discussion of specific
proposals is beyond the scope of this Note, but those considering the merits of
proposed changes would do well to reflect on the potential repercussions for legal
activity all along the practice-experimentation spectrum.
As one example, consider a prominent set of recent proposals from a group
1256-58 (rejecting the notion of informed consent as a waiver of conflicts of interest in cause
lawyering), as well as with general problems with informed consent that have manifested in the
research context, see Sugarman et al., supra note 21, at 6 (noting that despite informed consent, up
to 40% of research subjects are unaware that they are enrolled in a research study); Tavernise,
supra note 217 (explaining that fear of legal liability has resulted in "voluminous [informed
consent] forms that do more to protect the institution than to empower the potential subject").
267. See supra notes 126 and 127 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Erik Mazzone, The Innovation Imperative: Adapt or Die?, 39 L. PRAC. 4 (2013)
(suggesting institutional innovations in response to recession and discussing barriers to innovation).
269. See Clark, supra note 223, at 1028-34 (2012); Hadfield, supra note 127, at 9.
270. See Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three: Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client
Loyalty, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 567 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-gang-of-
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of thirty-three large corporate firms,27' who argued that the current rules limit the
firms' ability to effectively represent or sue certain entities. 2 72 The proposed
changes would likely allow firms to boost their profits by increasing the number
and diversity of permitted clients and causes of action. These revisions would
alter the landscape of attorney and firm incentives in routine practice, and some
critics have expressed concern about the repercussions of weakening existing
rules designed to safeguard attorneys' loyalty to their clients.273
What about the effects on innovation? A firm that develops a novel legal
product for Client A may have success replicating that product for other clients,
as explained in Section II.C. The current rules on conflicts of interest and
imputation prevent anyone in the firm from working on any matters on behalf of
entities that are adverse to Client A,2 74 So loosened rules on loyalty would allow
the firm to work with a much broader array of new clients. The proposal would
thus seem to offer a means of accelerating innovation in the corporate world,
since the experts who develop novel products and theories would be able to
spread them more quickly to more potential clients.
On the other hand, relaxing the rules on conflicts of interest might also harm
Client A's interests. Imagine Entity B who is adverse to Client A. After the
innovative transaction is completed on behalf of Client A, Entity B might
expressly seek out the same firm in order to take advantage of their unique
expertise on the workings of that novel product. The proposal would permit such
representation even while the firm continued to represent Client A, as long as the
adverse representation of Entity B did not pertain to a "substantially related"
275matter. Thus, the potential for the adverse Entity B to gain an unfair advantage
would depend on how far courts were willing to stretch that language. Courts that
recognize the large role that some corporate attorneys play in guiding corporate
strategy and direction276 may well take a broad view of matters "substantially
related" to the representation, which would significantly attenuate the proposal's
impact.
Given the lack of specific rules for innovation in the law, the only
271. See, e.g., id. (describing changes proposed by 33 AmLaw 100 firms).
272. See Robert C. Bernius et al., Proposals of Law Firm General Counsel for Future
Regulation of Relationships Between Law Firms and Sophisticated Clients, ABA COMM'N ON
ETHICS 20/20 (Mar. 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/files/ABAEthicsCommissionProposals
--93-8-1 l.pdf (proposing a new set of rules on conflicts of interest and limitations on liability for
"sophisticated clients").
273. See Fox, supra note 270; Diane Lourdes Dick, Legal Ethics, Commercial Practice, and
the Certainty Imperative: A Cautionary Note, 40 N. Ky. L. REv. 279, 286-88 (2013).
274. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.10; see also Fox, supra note 270, at 572-
74 (discussing rules on conflicts of interest).
275. Bernius et al., supra note 272, at 4.
276. See supra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
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protections for clients and for society are those built into the general professional
code of conduct. A change like loosened restrictions on conflicts of interest may
well alter firms' decision making on when and how to pursue legal outcomes
with broad impacts beyond the specific case. These questions of incentives for
firms and individual attorneys merit further discussion.
C. Attitudes Toward Rules
I conclude with a final contrast between the medical and legal professions
that relates to their attitudes toward rules and authority. Doctors are trained to be
"autonomous decision-makers" who make tough choices on the fly in the face of
overwhelming uncertainty.27 Swapping one set of written rules for another when
physician-researchers switch from medical practice to clinical research may
create new legal obligations, but will not necessarily undermine the medical
professional's deep-seated faith that she can trust her gut and follow her instincts.
Legal education is precisely the opposite, inculcating students with the habit
of referring back to sources of authority and verifying compliance.27 8 Clever
attorneys can always find a loophole, and it seems corporate and cause lawyers
may have done just that with regard to the Model Rules: they've accommodated
the requirements of client-centered advocacy by playing a role in defining their
clients' goals, as well as by seeking out the right kind of clients. This latter
behavior may once have been difficult to reconcile with state prohibitions on
solicitation,2 7 9 but the In re Primus decision took care of that problem. 280 ACLU
attorney Edna Primus did what cause lawyers do best when they encounter an
objectionable law: she climbed up to the Supreme Court and used litigation to
change it.
These prevailing professional attitudes about authority work in precisely
opposite directions, which explains how they managed to produce the same
ultimate effect of gravitating toward the center of the practice-experimentation
spectrum. The medical profession is regulated by strict legal requirements on
clinical research, but physician-researchers have learned to be comfortable
making decisions in defiance of specific rules whenever doing so seems to be in
277. Sage, supra note 67, at 59; accord Riskin et al., supra note 15, at 690 (noting that
"[s]urgeons are fundamentally decision makers," which is why they "have historically been idea
generators and creative practitioners within their craft").
278. See SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 20, at 51; Kutak, supra note 191, at 315; Sage,
supra note 67, at 59 ("[R]ule-based governance is natural to lawyers, whose business is writing,
interpreting, and enforcing rules.").
279. See, e.g., MELTSNER & SCHRAG, supra note 59, at 86. This book was published four years
before the In re Primus decision, and the authors sigh that "[w]ere it not for the ethical restrictions
on advertising and solicitation, the public interest lawyer might simply identify the characteristics
of the ideal plaintiff, locate him, and ask him if he would mind lending his name to a suit."
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the best interest of their patients. Innovating lawyers, on the other hand, face no
additional regulatory strictures on their work, but their rule-abiding tendencies
result in processes of innovation and experimentation that often fully comply
with the demands of the practice-centric Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Trial and error" is a familiar heuristic for problem solving that involves
repeated attempts with varied methods until an approach finally works or
generates clues for further refining the strategy. Clinical trials and judicial trials
both demand a far more systematic approach, but they do involve the risk of
"error" to the extent that patients and clients may be subjected to the risk of the
unknown, albeit often with their consent. In routine practice, such risk would
only be imposed when it furthered the principal's own goals, but experimentation
is precisely designed to discover the unknown, using individual cases to map out
new territory with "generalizable knowledge."
Moving along the spectrum from routine practice to experimentation
involves a growing focus on generalizable knowledge as agents abstract away
from the needs of individual principals. Successful innovative practice and
experimentation also require deep professional expertise and resources, whether
in the form of financial or human capital. As a result, these activities tend to be
concentrated in practice settings like academic medical centers, public interest
law organizations, and prestigious private firms.
Though the processes of innovation are similar across medicine and law,
there are notable differences arising out of the unique structure of the American
legal system. The two professions also face starkly divergent regulatory models:
medicine has a bright line dividing clinical practice from clinical research, while
lawyers of all stripes are governed by the same code of professional ethics.
Nevertheless, professionals all along the spectrum in both occupations seem to
lean toward the center, combining the novelty of innovation with the principal-
centered orientation of traditional practice. In this way, medicine and law achieve
a rough balance in according equal weight to principles and principals.
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